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Abstract 
We use insurance claims data for 27.6 percent of individuals with private employer-sponsored insurance in 
the US between 2007 and 2011 to examine the variation in health spending and in hospitals’ transaction 
prices. We document the variation in hospital prices within and across geographic areas, examine how 
hospital prices influence the variation in health spending on the privately insured, and analyze the factors 
associated with hospital price variation. Four key findings emerge. First, health care spending per privately 
insured beneficiary varies by a factor of three across the 306 Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs) in the US. 
Moreover, the correlation between total spending per privately insured beneficiary and total spending per 
Medicare beneficiary across HRRs is only 0.14. Second, variation in providers’ transaction prices across 
HRRs is the primary driver of spending variation for the privately insured, whereas variation in the quantity 
of care provided across HRRs is the primary driver of Medicare spending variation. Consequently, 
extrapolating lessons on health spending from Medicare to the privately insured must be done with caution. 
Third, we document large dispersion in overall inpatient hospital prices and in prices for seven relatively 
homogenous procedures. For example, hospital prices for lower-limb MRIs vary by a factor of twelve across 
the nation and, on average, two-fold within HRRs. Finally, hospital prices are positively associated with 
indicators of hospital market power. Even after conditioning on many demand and cost factors, hospital 
prices in monopoly markets are 15.3 percent higher than those in markets with four or more hospitals. 
Keywords: healthcare, health spending, prices, price dispersion, competition, market structure 
JEL codes: I11; L10; L11 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Growth Programme. The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
We are grateful to seminar participants at the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the Department of 
Commerce, Dartmouth University, NBER, Northwestern University, Stanford University, and Yale 
University for helpful comments. This project received financial support from the Commonwealth Fund, 
the National Institute for Health Care Management, and the Economic and Social Research Council. We 
acknowledge the assistance of the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI) and its data contributors, Aetna, 
Humana, and United Healthcare, in providing the data analyzed in this study. The data used in this paper 
can be accessed with permission from HCCI. We have not accepted any financial support from HCCI or 
the HCCI data contributors. We thank Maralou Burnham, James Schaeffer, and Douglas Whitehead for 
exceptional assistance creating our data extract. Jennifer Wu, Nathan Shekita, Austin Jaspers, Nina 
Russell, Darien Lee, and Christina Ramsay provided outstanding research assistance. The opinions 
expressed in this paper and any errors are those of the authors alone. More details on our analysis can be 
found online at www.healthcarepricingproject.org.  
Zack Cooper, Yale University; Stuart Craig, University of Pennsylvania; Martin Gaynor, Carnegie 
Mellon University, University of Bristol and NBER; John Van Reenen, Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics and NBER. 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be 
issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the editor 
at the above address. 
 Z. Cooper, S. Craig, M. Gaynor  and J. Van Reenen, submitted 2015. 
1 
I. Introduction 
Health care is one of the largest sectors of the US economy, accounting for 17.4 percent 
of US GDP in 2013. Sixty percent of the population has private health insurance, which pays for 
a third of health care spending (Hartman et al. 2015). However, because of poor data availability, 
most of the analysis of US health care spending has relied on Medicare data (Medicare covers 
Americans age sixty-five and over as well as individuals with a subset of disabilities). While 
research on Medicare spending has yielded remarkable insights, Medicare covers only 16 percent 
of the population and 20 percent of total health care spending. Moreover, whereas Medicare 
hospital prices are set by a regulator (as is true for prices for health care services in most 
countries), hospital prices for the privately insured are market-determined. Each private insurer 
engages in bilateral negotiations with providers over the price of services for their beneficiaries. 
Unfortunately, the results of these hospital/insurer negotiations – health care providers’ 
transaction prices – have been treated as commercially sensitive and have been largely 
unavailable to researchers. As a result, there is a great deal that is unknown about how and why 
health care providers’ prices vary across the nation and the extent to which providers’ negotiated 
prices influence overall health spending for the privately insured.  
In this paper, we use a recently released, large health insurance claims database that 
covers 27.6 percent of individuals in the US with employer-sponsored insurance coverage to 
study the variation in health spending for the privately insured. We examine the role that 
providers’ negotiated transaction prices play in driving the variation in health spending on the 
privately insured. We then exploit the granularity of our data to examine how hospitals’ 
transaction prices vary within and across geographic regions in the US and identify the key 
factors associated with this price variation.  
The main data we use in this analysis are insurance claims between 2007 and 2011 from 
three of the five largest US insurers: Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealthcare (the Health Care 
Cost Institute dataset). The data include more than eighty-eight million unique individuals and 
account for approximately 5 percent of total health spending and 1 percent of GDP annually. 
Further, the data contain claims-level detail including clinical diagnoses and procedure codes, 
patient characteristics, provider-specific negotiated transaction prices, and patient cost-sharing 
contributions. In this paper we focus primarily on hospital spending and hospital prices. 
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Hospitals represent 31 percent of health care spending and 5.6 percent of GDP. Furthermore, 
hospital care is expensive (the average price of an inpatient admission in 2011 is $12,976 in our 
data), so variation in hospital spending and prices can have a significant impact on welfare.  
Research on US health spending using Medicare data has had a profound impact on our 
understanding of the factors that drive health care spending variation and on state and federal 
policy. As a result, it is vital to understand the applicability of analysis of Medicare spending 
(and the policy conclusions drawn from that analysis) to the privately insured. Therefore, a 
secondary focus of this paper is examining the extent to which the factors that drive spending 
variation for the privately insured are the same as those that influence health care spending for 
the Medicare population.  
We point to four main conclusions from our work. First, health spending on the privately 
insured varies by more than a factor of three across the 306 hospital referral regions (HRRs) in 
the US.1 Further, healthcare spending on the privately insured and Medicare beneficiaries are not 
highly correlated across HRRs. For example, in 2011 the correlation between private and 
Medicare total health spending per beneficiary across HRRs was only 0.140.2 To illustrate the 
point, policy-makers have identified Grand Junction, Colorado as an exemplar of health-sector 
efficiency based on analyses of Medicare data (Bodenheimer and West 2010; Obama 2009a). In 
2011, we find that Grand Junction does indeed have the third lowest spending per Medicare 
beneficiary among HRRs. However, in the same year, Grand Junction had the ninth highest 
average inpatient prices and the forty-third highest spending per privately insured beneficiary of 
the nation’s 306 HRRs. Likewise, we find that other regions, such as Rochester, Minnesota, and 
La Crosse, Wisconsin, which have also received attention from policy-makers for their low 
spending on Medicare, are among the highest spending regions for the privately insured.  
Second, for the privately insured, hospital transaction prices play a large role in driving 
inpatient spending variation across HRRs. In contrast, consistent with the existing literature, we 
find that variation in hospitals’ Medicare prices (i.e., reimbursements) across HRRs account for 
1 Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs) are geographic regions created by researchers at the Dartmouth Institute for 
Health Care Policy to approximate markets for tertiary medical care in the United States. Each HRR generally 
includes at least one major referral center. They were designed to capture areas where patients would be referred for 
major cardiovascular surgery or neurosurgery. The United States is broken into 306 HRRs. See 
www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/methods/geogappdx.pdf for more information. 
2 The correlation of inpatient spending across HRRs for Medicare beneficiaries and the privately insured is 0.267.   
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little of the variation in Medicare inpatient spending across HRRs. Instead, differences in the 
quantity of health care delivered across HRRs are the primary drivers of inpatient spending 
variation for the Medicare population. 
Third, we find that hospitals’ negotiated transaction prices vary substantially across the 
nation. For example, looking at the most homogeneous of the seven procedures that examine, 
hospital-based MRIs of lower-limb joints, the most expensive hospital in the nation has prices 
twelve times as high as the least expensive hospital. What is more, this price variation occurs 
across and within geographic areas. The most expensive HRR has average MRI prices for the 
privately insured that are five times as high as average prices in the HRR with the lowest average 
prices. Likewise, within HRRs, on average, the most expensive hospital has MRI negotiated 
transaction prices twice as large as the least expensive hospital. In contrast, within the regulated 
Medicare reimbursement system, the hospital with the highest reimbursement for lower limb 
MRIs in the nation is paid 1.87 times the least reimbursed. Likewise, within HRRs, the highest 
reimbursed hospital is, on average, paid only 6 percent more by Medicare than the rate of the 
lowest reimbursed hospital.  
Finally, we describe some of the observable factors correlated with hospital prices. 
Measures of hospital market structure are strongly correlated with higher hospital prices. Being 
for-profit, having more medical technologies, being located in an area with high labor costs, 
being a bigger hospital, being located in an area with lower income, and having a low share of 
Medicare patients are all associated with higher prices. However, even after controlling for these 
factors and including HRR fixed effects, we estimate that monopoly hospitals have 15.3 percent 
higher prices than markets with four or more hospitals. Similarly, hospitals in duopoly markets 
have prices that are 6.4 percent higher and hospitals in triopoly markets have prices that are 4.8 
percent higher than hospitals located in markets with four or more hospitals. While we cannot 
make strong causal statements, these estimates do suggest that hospital market structure is 
strongly related to hospital prices. 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we provide background on health care 
spending and the existing literature. Section III discusses data, and Section IV examines the 
relationship between Medicare and private spending. Section V characterizes hospital price 
dispersion. Section VI analyzes the factors associated with the variation in inpatient prices and 
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prices. Section VII concludes. More details about the data and additional analysis are in Online 
Appendices A and B. 
 
II. Health Care Spending, Hospital Prices, and Price Dispersion 
IIA. Background 
The prices private insurers pay for health care services are determined by bilateral 
negotiations between insurers and providers. Hospitals have a “chargemaster,” which presents 
the list or “sticker” prices for each procedure hospitals perform and for all the medical items 
associated with care. However, private insurers seldom pay these chargemaster prices (referred 
to as “charges”). Typically, insurers pay hospitals either a percentage of their chargemaster 
prices, a markup over the hospital’s Medicare reimbursements, or they negotiate with hospitals 
over the prices of individual procedures or service lines (Reinhardt 2006). While Medicare 
payments to hospitals are public, the prices that hospitals negotiate with private insurers have 
historically been treated as commercially sensitive and are generally unavailable to researchers 
and the public. In the absence of data on actual, hospital-level transaction prices, researchers 
have generally constructed estimates of transaction prices or in rare cases had access to 
transaction price data for a very limited sample (e.g., for a particular market as the result of an 
antitrust case, data from a particular company, or data from a particular state). However, in the 
absence of nationwide data on actual transaction prices, there is a great deal that remains 
unknown about health care spending and hospital prices for the privately insured, including the 
factors that influence their variation. 
 
IIB. Some Existing Literature 
Our work links to the existing literature on health spending and the determinants of 
hospital prices (in particular, hospital market structure). The bulk of our understanding about 
health care spending is based on the analysis of Medicare data. Previous analysis of Medicare 
data has revealed that risk-adjusted Medicare spending per beneficiary varies by more than a 
factor of two across HRRs in the US (Fisher et al. 2003). This variation cannot be explained by 
differences in patient characteristics across regions (Fisher, Bynum, and Skinner 2009). Instead, 
research has found that most of the variation in Medicare spending is driven by differences in the 
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quantity of health care delivered in different regions (Skinner and Fisher 2010). These findings 
are not surprising, since Medicare pays providers using administered prices that aim to capture 
the local costs associated with providing care in particular regions.3 Ultimately, this payment 
system constrains the amount hospital reimbursement rates can vary to a level specified by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Moreover, it results in providers within a 
geographic area being paid roughly the same amount for the same services. 
Recent analysis has suggested that Medicare spending per beneficiary may not be highly 
correlated with spending per privately insured beneficiary. Philipson et al. (2010) argued that 
while private insurers have a greater ability to limit the utilization of care than public insurers, 
public insurers have greater opportunities to exploit their monopsony power to constrain 
providers’ reimbursement rates. Using data at the three-digit zip code level from employees and 
retirees enrolled in health plans from thirty-five Fortune 500 firms and Medicare data from the 
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, they found that regional variation in utilization is greater 
for Medicare beneficiaries, while variation in spending appears to be greater for beneficiaries 
with private insurance. Chernew et al. (2010) analyzed MarketScan data from 1996 to 2006 and 
found a small negative correlation between private and Medicare spending per beneficiary across 
HRRs. Newhouse et al. (2013) also look at the correlations between private spending from two 
commercial data sources (MarketScan and Optum) and Medicare spending from 2007 through 
2009 and find correlations of between 0.081 and 0.112, respectively.4 The MarketScan data used 
in these studies are comprised of insurance claims for enrollees in large employers and group 
health plans. As a consequence, unlike HCCI, MarketScan does not cover insurance claims for 
individuals employed by medium and smaller firms, which account for a large share of the 
                                                        
3 For a detailed discussion of how Medicare pays providers, see Edmunds and Sloan (2012). Briefly, for inpatient 
hospital care, the Medicare PPS system pays providers a fixed, predetermined amount per medical-severity adjusted 
diagnosis related group (MS-DRG). The MS-DRGs are grouped by the primary diagnosis and then differentiated by 
the presence of comorbidities or complications. Hospitals’ reimbursement is divided into a labor and non-labor 
component. The labor component, which accounts for approximately 60 percent of a hospital’s reimbursement, is 
adjusted by a wage index that captures the input prices associated with providing care in the local area. Medicare 
hospital payments are also adjusted for hospital characteristics, so that teaching hospitals and hospitals that treat a 
large share of uninsured or Medicaid patients receive higher payments. 
4 Similarly, Franzini, Mikhail, and Skinner (2010) looked at spending by individuals insured by Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of Texas and found that spending per private beneficiary in McAllen, Texas was 7 percent lower than in El 
Paso. In contrast, a widely read New Yorker article highlighted that Medicare spending per beneficiary in McAllen 
Texas was four times higher than it was in El Paso during the same period (Gawande 2009). 
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privately insured (National Institute for Health Care Management 2013).5 In addition, although it 
covers approximately 90 percent of HRRs, the MarketScan data have very low numbers of 
patients in some less populated areas (e.g. many HRRs have fewer than 200 patients per year, 
whereas the least populated HRR in the HCCI data includes 4,402 patients).6 The Optum data 
include claims from 2006 through 2010 for 14 million individuals per year from self-insured 
firms and claims for 9 million individuals per year with private commercial insurance (The 
Lewin Group 2012).  This is approximately half the number of covered lives per year that we 
have in the HCCI data.  
Some recent studies have also obtained limited data on providers’ negotiated prices. The 
United States Government Accountability Office (2005) analyzed health care claims data from 
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program and found that hospital prices varied by 259 
percent across metropolitan areas. The Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office (Coakley 2011) 
found that hospitals’ prices varied by over 300 percent in the state and argued that these prices 
were uncorrelated with hospital quality or teaching status. Using insurance claims data for 
beneficiaries in eight cities, Ginsburg (2010) found that San Francisco hospitals’ private prices 
were 210 percent of Medicare reimbursements compared with 147 percent in Miami. Similarly, 
White, Reschovsky, and Bond (2014) use claims data from autoworkers to examine hospital 
prices in thirteen Midwestern markets. They found that the highest priced hospitals in a market 
were typically paid 60 percent more for inpatient care than the lowest priced hospitals.7  
There is a large literature on hospital competition (see Gaynor, Ho, and Town 2015), 
which has generally found that hospital prices are substantially higher in more concentrated                                                         
5 Twenty-five percent of workers with employer sponsored health insurance were employed in firms of size 49 or 
less, thirty-four percent in firms smaller than one hundred, and forty-nine percent in firms of size four hundred 
ninety-nine or less (NIHCM Foundation 2013). 
6 We provide further detail on the contrast between MarketScan and HCCI in Appendix A1. MarketScan data are not 
useable for this research because it does not include unique hospital IDs, it cannot be linked to external data on 
hospitals, and it does not include geographic detail lower than the three-digit zip code level.  
7 While notable, this sort of variation is not unique to health care. Many other industries exhibit price variation. 
Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser (1979) find large price variation for a range of services in the Boston area. They find, 
for example, that prices in the markets for bicycles, mufflers, dry cleaning, pet cleaning, and vocal lessons have 
coefficients of variation of 0.044, 0.174, 0.168, 0.128, and 0.383, respectively. Hortasçu and Syverson (2004) 
document extensive variation in mutual fund fees. Eizenberg, Lach, and Yiftach (2015) observe extensive price 
variation in retail prices at supermarkets in Jerusalem. Similarly, Kaplan and Menzio (2014) use data from the Kilts-
Nielson Consumer panel data and find that the coefficient of variation for 36 oz. plastic bottles of Heinz ketchup is 
0.23 in Minneapolis in 2007. Therefore, while we focus on health care in this study, price dispersion is a common 
phenomenon and understanding the determinants of price dispersion a general problem.  
    
7 
markets. The majority of this literature, however, uses estimates of transaction prices (usually 
based on charges) rather than actual data on transaction prices and mostly employs data from just 
one state - California.  
We extend the literature by using a new, comprehensive database that covers a larger 
population in more detail than anything previously examined. Previous work has relied on data 
covering particular states, small groups of cities, or groups of companies. We capture claims for 
individuals with employer-sponsored insurance from three of the five largest insurers in the US. 
Moreover, rather than using charges or estimated prices, we have the actual transaction prices 
that capture the true payments made for care. This allows us to examine variation in spending 
and price and contribute to the broader literature on price dispersion. Finally, we add to the 
hospital competition literature by using comprehensive data on actual transaction prices for 
2,252 hospitals across all fifty states to observe the relationship between market structure and 
hospital prices.  
 
III. Data and Variables 
III.A HCCI data 
The main data we use in this analysis come from the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI).8 
We discuss the data in more detail in Appendix A but sketch some of the main features here. The 
HCCI database includes insurance claims for individuals with employer-sponsored insurance 
obtained from three large insurance companies.9 Our data cover the period 2007 to 2011.10 Table 
1 shows that the raw data contain 2.92 billion claims for 88.7 million unique individuals. Figure 
A1 shows the proportion of the privately insured that the HCCI data cover by state.11 The data 
                                                        
8 HCCI is a nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing knowledge about US health care costs and utilization. See 
http://www.healthcostinstitute.org for more information. 
9 The data include claims from fully insured and self-insured firms.  
10 The HCCI data does not include all employer-sponsored insurance plans offered by the data contributors. Some of 
the three insurers’ customers have opted not to have their data made available for research. Likewise, insurance 
plans that cover individuals working on national security-related matters are not included in the HCCI data.  
11 At the high end, the data capture more than 30 percent of the relevant population in Texas, Arizona, Colorado, 
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Ohio, Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. At the low end, there are between 1.9 
percent and 10 percent of the privately insured in Vermont, Michigan, Alabama, Wyoming, Montana, South Dakota, 
and Hawaii. 
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include individuals in all 306 HRRs.12 Although we describe the most comprehensive picture to 
date of the privately insured, we do not have claims from every insurer and, in particular, from 
the Blue Cross Blue Shield insurers. However, to address concerns about the generalizability of 
our results, we show below that our results are stable across areas where the HCCI data have 
high and low coverage of the insured population and where Blue Cross Blue Shield plans have 
high and low coverage of the insured population.  
The de-identified claims data from HCCI include a unique provider identifier, a unique 
patient identifier, the date services were provided, the amount providers’ charged (chargemaster 
price), providers’ negotiated transaction prices (broken down by facilities and physician fees), 
and payments to providers made by patients. As a result, we know the amounts paid to hospitals 
for all health care encounters recorded in our data whether a hospital was paid on a fee-for-
service or per-diem basis.13 
III.B Hospital Level data
We use an encrypted version of health care providers’ National Plan and Provider 
Identification System (NPI) code in the HCCI to link to data on hospital characteristics from the 
American Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey, quality scores from Medicare’s Hospital 
Compare webpage, Medicare activity from the American Hospital Directory (AHD), Medicare 
reimbursement information from CMS, and reputational quality scores from U.S. News & World 
Report. We use hospitals’ five-digit zip codes to link to local area characteristics from the 
census. A complete list of data sources is contained in Appendix A1. Our process for identifying 
hospitals using their NPI code is outlined in Appendix A2.  
III.C Sample Definitions 
All our analysis is carried out on data for individuals age eighteen through sixty-four 
years with private employer-sponsored health insurance. We create three broad sub-samples 
from the raw HCCI data: the “spending sample”, the “inpatient sample” and the “procedure 
samples”.  
12 In 2011, the least populated HRR in the data (Great Falls, Montana) contained 4,402 members. The most 
populated HRR (Houston, Texas) contained 1,753,724 individuals. 
13  We present a sample hip replacement episode constructed from claims data online at 
www.healthcarepricingproject.org 
    
9 
The spending sample measures overall spending per private beneficiary, including all 
inpatient, outpatient, and physician spending (but not drug spending).14 We calculate spending 
per beneficiary by summing spending for each individual insured in each HRR per year. To get 
the total number of private beneficiaries per HRR, we sum up the member months of coverage 
per HRR per year and divide by twelve. We limit our analysis to individuals enrolled in coverage 
for at least six months. In most instances, we present spending analysis of our most recent year 
of data, 2011.15  We use data from the Dartmouth Atlas for 2008 through 2011 to analyze 
variation in spending per Medicare beneficiary.16 Following the approach taken by Dartmouth, 
we risk-adjust our HCCI spending sample for age and sex.17  
The inpatient sample uses hospital claims for all inpatient care provided to our covered 
population. We limit our analysis to services provided within AHA-registered facilities that self-
identified as short-term general medical and surgical hospitals, orthopedic hospitals, cardiac 
hospitals, and obstetric and gynecology hospitals.18 We aggregate our claims-level data to the 
level of an individual inpatient stay, which we call an “episode”. This includes all of a patient’s 
claims from admission through discharge. We limit our providers to those that deliver at least 
fifty episodes of inpatient care per year.19 This restriction excludes approximately 10 percent of 
inpatient observations in our data. We also exclude observations with missing provider IDs or 
missing patient information and those observations with prices in the top or bottom 1 percent of 
the distributions per Diagnosis Related Group (DRG).20 We drop patients in the top 1 percent of 
                                                        
14 We exclude prescription drug spending because it is not readily available for Medicare beneficiaries. 
15 Analysis of other years is very similar and full results are available online at www.healthcarepricingproject.org. 
16  Data from the Dartmouth Atlas can be downloaded at: http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/tools/downloads.aspx. 
Information on how Medicare spending per beneficiary is calculated is available in their Research Methods 
document, accessible at: http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/methods/research_methods.pdf. 
17 Because we do not have data on race, we risk-adjust using age and sex as opposed to Dartmouth who risk-adjust 
using age, sex, and race. Like Dartmouth, we also risk-adjust spending using indirect standardization. For a detailed 
discussion of the risk-adjustment methods, see: 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/methods/indirect_adjustment.pdf. 
18  We exclude longer-term facilities like rehabilitation hospitals, and specialized facilities, like psychiatric or 
pediatric hospitals. We include specialty hospitals that perform the inpatient or outpatient care analyzed in our 
procedure samples.   
19 We introduced this restriction because some hospitals treated very few HCCI-covered patients. These hospitals 
would have had price indexes created using small numbers of DRGs, which could have produced irregular price 
observations. Results are robust to using other minimum thresholds such as thirty or seventy cases per year. 
20 Our results are robust to winsorizing the top and bottom 1 percent instead of excluding them. We exclude 
episodes with spending in the top or bottom 1 percent per DRG to limit the influence of extremely expensive and 
extremely inexpensive observations (e.g., the $9 million knee replacement). 
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length of stay by DRG to exclude cases with complications where the patients remained in the 
hospital for extremely long lengths of time (i.e., twenty-one days or more). Finally, we exclude 
providers registered with CMS as critical access hospitals.21 In total, all these exclusions lead to 
a subsample of 2,252 out of the 3,830 AHA hospitals that meet our restriction criteria (see Table 
A1).  
We also create seven procedure samples, which capture claims for hospital-based 
surgical or diagnostic inpatient and outpatient procedures. We create procedure samples for hip 
replacements, knee replacements, cesarean sections, vaginal deliveries, percutaneous 
transluminal coronary angioplasties (PTCAs), diagnostic colonoscopies, and magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) of lower-limb joints without contrast. These procedures occur with sufficient 
frequency to support empirical analysis and are relatively homogeneous, thereby facilitating 
comparison across facilities and areas (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2010). 
Each observation in the seven procedure samples includes all hospital (facilities) claims 
from when the patient entered the hospital until he or she exited the facility. We limit the 
observations included in our analysis to those without major medical complications and define 
the conditions narrowly using diagnosis and procedure codes (see Appendix A3). We limit our 
observations to providers who deliver at least ten of a given procedure per year. As in the 
inpatient sample we drop individual observations with prices in the top or bottom 1 percent or 
with length of stay in the top 1 percent and limit providers to those registered with the AHA that 
self-identified as short-term general medical and surgical, orthopedic, cardiac, obstetric and 
gynecology hospitals.22  
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the inpatient sample.23 Our sample of hospitals is 
generally similar to the universe of AHA hospitals, but there are some differences (Table A1). 
Hospitals in the inpatient sample are located in less concentrated markets and also have a higher 
share of teaching and not-for-profit facilities, as well as a greater share of hospitals ranked by the 
U.S. News & World Reports as top performers. The hospitals in our samples also receive slightly                                                         
21 Critical access hospitals are facilities with less than twenty-five beds in rural areas that Medicare reimburses 
differently from other hospitals in order to make them financially viable.  
22 For MRI we also require a separate physician claim for the reading of the MRI, which we do not include in our 
main analyses of price. We also limit MRI observations to outpatient cases where the only purpose of visiting the 
hospital is to have the MRI (and nothing else is done to the patient on the day of the MRI).  
23 The descriptive statistics for the sub-samples for each of the seven procedures look qualitatively similar and are 
available online at www.healthcarepricingproject.org.  
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higher payments from Medicare and treat a larger share of Medicare patients than the universe of 
AHA-registered hospitals.  
III.D Measuring Hospital-level Prices
We measure hospital prices in two ways. First, we create a private-payer overall inpatient 
price index that is adjusted for the mix of care that hospitals deliver and the mix of patients that 
hospitals treat. This measure is similar to what has been used previously in the literature; for 
example, in Gaynor and Vogt (2003) and Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015). Second, we 
construct procedure-level price indexes for six surgical and one imaging procedure. For the 
procedure prices, we chose procedures that are generally considered to be fairly homogeneous so 
that we isolate variation in price rather than variation in the type of care delivered within each 
episode. For inpatient procedures, the procedure price captures the combined price on all claims 
associated with services provided to the patient by hospitals, from admission through discharge. 
For outpatient procedures (colonoscopies and MRIs), the price the price is the sum of all claims 
on the day the patient was in the hospital for the MRI or the colonoscopy. For colonoscopies and 
MRIs, we further limit our analysis to observations where no other medical care was provided to 
patient on the day of the MRI or colonoscopy and exclude MRIs and colonoscopies that were 
performed within a wider hospital stay. As a robustness check, we also examine the sum of 
hospital and physician prices for inpatient and procedure prices.  
A general concern when analyzing differences in prices across firms is that variation in 
prices could reflect unobserved differences in quality. For example, a hospital could look like it 
has high-priced hip replacements either because its price is actually higher or because the type of 
surgery it performs for a hip replacement is different from what is performed at other hospitals.  
We work to address this concern in several ways. First, we define our procedures 
narrowly and seek to avoid DRGs with very differentiated treatments and episodes where there 
were complications. Second, as we discuss later, we risk-adjust each price measure by age, sex, 
and patients’ underlying comorbidities, which we measure using the Charlson Index of 
Comorbidities.24 Third, we choose high volume, routine surgeries and imaging tests where the 
24 The Charlson Index is a measure of the probability that a patient will die within a year. It is calculated as a 
weighted sum of the patient’s comorbid conditions, such as cancer or diabetes. We measure the Charlson Index on a 
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treatments are largely standardized. To further narrow our sample, we exclude colonoscopies 
where a biopsy was taken. Fourth, we also measure prices and price variation for lower-limb 
MRIs. For MRIs, we restrict our observations to those for which the MRI itself was the only 
intervention occurring during the visit to the hospital and for which there is a separate 
professional claim for the reading of the MRI, so that the facility portion only captures the 
technical component of the MRI. There is virtually no difference in how MRIs are performed 
across facilities and these represent a plausibly homogenous product. Fifth, for knee and hip 
replacements, we limit our analysis to individuals between forty-five and sixty-four years of age 
to obtain a more homogeneous group of patients. For cesarean and vaginal delivery, we limit our 
analysis to mothers who are between twenty-five and thirty-four years of age. 
Inpatient Price Index: Our private-payer inpatient price index captures the combined 
amount paid by patients and insurers for patient episode i in DRG d delivered in hospital h, and 
provided in year t. Following Gaynor and Vogt (2003) and Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town 
(2015), we regress the hospital payments (𝑝𝑖,ℎ,𝑑,𝑡) on year-specific hospital fixed effects (𝛼ℎ,𝑡), a 
vector of patient characteristics (𝑋𝑖,ℎ,𝑑,𝑡) comprised of indicators for patient age (measured in 
ten-year age bands), a dummy for the patient’s sex, and dummies for patients’ Charlson Index 
score, and DRG fixed effects (𝛾𝑑 ). The regression to produce our inpatient prices has the form: 
(1)        𝑝𝑖,ℎ,𝑑,𝑡 =  𝛼ℎ,𝑡 +  Χ𝑖,ℎ,𝑑,𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾𝑑  + ℇ𝑖,ℎ,𝑑,𝑡  
with  ℇ𝑖,ℎ,𝑑,𝑡 the stochastic error term. We recover the vector of hospital fixed effects ?̂?ℎ,𝑡 and 
calculate a hospital price index for each year at the sample means of the patient characteristics 
(?̅?) and the DRG indicators, ?̅?  (i.e., the sample mean basket of DRGs).25  
(2)    ?̂?ℎ,𝑡 =  ?̂?ℎ,𝑡 + ?̅??̂? + ?̅?𝛾𝑑 
This yields the hospital’s price, adjusted for its mix of treatments and mix of patients.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
zero-to-six scale based on six months of insurance claims data. For more information, see Charlson et al. (1987) or 
Quan et al. (2011).  
25  For robustness, we also created alternate price indexes using different functional forms. For example, we 
calculated regressions where DRG complexity was parameterized using CMS’s MS-DRG weights as right hand side 
control variables, rather than as fixed-effects for each DRG. We also calculated a price index where we regressed 
the DRG price divided by the DRG weight against patient characteristics and hospital fixed effects. These price 
measures are all highly correlated with each other (correlation coefficients greater than 0.95), and using alternative 
price measures does not materially affect our results. 
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Procedure price indexes: In addition to creating an inpatient price index, we also create 
risk-adjusted prices for the specific procedures we study. We adjust prices for differences in 
patient characteristics, just as we did in the inpatient price index. These regressions take the 
form:  
(3)            𝑝𝑖,ℎ,𝑑,𝑡 =  𝛼ℎ,𝑑,𝑡 +  Χ𝑖,ℎ,𝑑,𝑡𝛽𝑑 + 𝑒𝑖,ℎ,𝑑,𝑡   
Superscript d indicates one of our seven procedures (a slight abuse of notation since these are 
actually narrower than a DRG). We then recover our estimates of the hospital-year-procedure 
fixed effects analogously to equation (2). 
Table A3 reports the main results from estimating equations (1) and (3). 
 
III.E Calculating Medicare Reimbursement 
We also construct hospital Medicare reimbursement rates for the services we observe 
from the HCCI data. Medicare reimburses providers for inpatient care on the basis of DRGs; 
these are set in an attempt to compensate hospitals slightly above their costs of treating Medicare 
patients. To calculate the payment for specific episodes of care, federal regulations stipulate that 
a hospital’s base payment is multiplied by a DRG weight that is set by CMS to capture the 
complexity of treating a particular type of episode. Using data obtained from the CMS webpage, 
we follow the regulations and calculate the base payment rate for every hospital for every year 
from 2008 through 2011, including adjustments for wage index reclassifications, indirect 
medical education payments, and disproportionate share payments. The base payment rate is the 
hospital’s Medicare price before any adjustment for its specific mix of DRGs. This is analogous 
to the risk-adjusted private price. In addition, we also obtain DRG weights from CMS that allow 
us to know the rates CMS paid hospitals for every DRG per year from 2008 through 2011. We 
also create Medicare reimbursement rates for our outpatient services using the relevant 
ambulatory payment classification weights.   
 
III.F Descriptives Statistics on Prices 
Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations, range and cross-correlations of our 
inpatient hospital price index, procedure prices and the Medicare inpatient base payment rate 
averaged across 2008–2011. There is high correlation within service lines (e.g., the correlation of 
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hip with knee replacements is 0.932) and weaker but still substantial correlation across service 
lines (e.g., the correlation of knee replacement with vaginal delivery prices is 0.506). By 
contrast, there is a low correlation between the Medicare base payment rate with both the 
inpatient price (0.165) and the procedure prices (ranging between -0.001 and 0.298). Medicare 
attempts to set administered prices to cover hospitals’ costs so the base payment rate should be a 
reasonable proxy for exogenous cost pressures like local wages. Therefore, the low correlation 
between Medicare and private prices suggests that private price variation is driven by more than 
simply variation in costs. We address this further in Section VI. 
 The difference between Medicare and private-payer payment rates is substantial. Figure 1 
shows that Medicare payments are 53 percent of private rates for inpatient care, 55 percent for 
hip replacement, 56 percent for knee replacement, 67 percent for cesarean delivery, 65 percent 
for vaginal delivery, 52 percent for PTCA, 39 percent for colonoscopy, and 27 percent for MRI. 
As an illustration of the magnitude of this difference, we estimate that if (rather than using the 
true private-payer prices) private prices were set 20 percent higher than Medicare rates, inpatient 
spending on the privately insured would decrease by 17.4 percent.26  
There has also been significant interest in hospitals’ charges - the list prices for hospital 
services.27 Indeed, in 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services began releasing 
hospital charge information for all inpatient claims billed to Medicare (Department of Health and 
Human Services 2013). However, hospital charges capture neither the levels nor the variation in 
transaction prices. Figure 1 also illustrates the relative magnitudes of charges compared to 
negotiated prices. Charges are between 157 percent and 193 percent of the negotiated prices. 
Figure 2 presents a scatter plot showing the relationship between hospital charges and negotiated 
private-payer prices for knee replacements in 2011. There is a positive correlation but it is only 
0.31. The other procedures, presented in Figure A2, have similarly low correlations between 
charges and transaction prices ranging between 0.25 and 0.48. These low correlations illustrate 
the importance of using transaction rather than list prices to analyze hospital pricing.                                                         
26 This thought experiment holds quantity constant (i.e., assumes no behavioral response). If inpatient care was paid 
at 100 percent of Medicare rates, it would lower spending by 31.2 percent. Similarly, paying at 110 percent of 
Medicare, 130 percent of Medicare, and 140 percent of Medicare would lower spending by 24.2 percent 10.5 
percent and 3.7 percent, respectively. 
27 For example, see Bai and Anderson (2015) and Hsia and Akosa Antwi (2014). There has also been significant 
interest in hospital charges from the popular press, e.g. Brill (2013). 
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IV. Medicare vs. Private Spending Per Beneficiary and the Contributions of Price and 
Quantity to Spending Variation 
 
IV.A Spending Variation across HRRs 
We present maps of overall spending per beneficiary across HRRs in 2011 in Figure 3. 
Panel A displays spending per privately insured beneficiary, and Panel B shows spending per 
Medicare beneficiary. As Figure 3 illustrates, there is substantial variation in private spending 
across the nation. In 2011, overall spending per privately insured beneficiary in the highest 
spending HRR (Napa, California) was $5,515.95, more than three times as high as spending in 
the lowest spending HRR (Honolulu, Hawaii), which spent $1,707.38 per person.28 Likewise, for 
the privately insured, the coefficient of variation for total spending across HRRs in 2011 is 0.152 
and the 90th-10th percentile ratio is 1.53. The corresponding statistics for Medicare spending are 
0.141 and 1.45, respectively. It is apparent that patterns of spending variation for the privately 
insured differ from those for the Medicare population. This is particularly evident in the northern 
Midwest states of Wisconsin, Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota. These states have fairly low 
spending per Medicare beneficiary and fairly high spending per privately insured beneficiary. 
The correlation in spending per Medicare beneficiary and spending per privately insured 
beneficiary is 0.140 overall, although it is higher for inpatient spending (0.267). 29 Maps of 
inpatient spending per beneficiary for Medicare and privately insured individuals are presented 
in Figure A3. The maps illustrate that areas with low Medicare spending are not generally those 
with low private spending and vice versa.                                                          
28 HCCI masking rules prohibit us identifying HRRs below a defined number of providers.  
29 To illustrate that our results are robust in areas where the HCCI data contributors have high and low market 
shares, we examine the correlations between spending per beneficiary for Medicare recipients and the privately 
insured in states where HCCI insurers have more than the median share of the privately insured beneficiaries and 
less than the median share. The median HCCI coverage per state is 20 percent of the privately insured. The 
correlation between overall spending per Medicare beneficiary and privately insured beneficiary is -0.01 when we 
limit our analysis to states where the HCCI data cover more than 20 percent of the privately insured. The correlation 
between overall spending per Medicare beneficiary and privately insured beneficiary is 0.212 when we limit our 
analysis to states with less than 20 percent of the privately insured. While the numbers vary, they do not alter the 
basic conclusion that private and Medicare spending are weakly correlated. We also carry out similar tests of 
robustness for states with above median Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BCBS) coverage rates (above 19 percent of total 
coverage) and states with below median coverage (based on 2011 data from CCIIO). In states with BCBS coverage 
above the median, the correlation between spending per HCCI beneficiary and spending per Medicare beneficiary is 
0.05. In states with low BCBS coverage, the correlation is 0.215. Again, the numbers differ, but the basic conclusion 
of low private/Medicare correlation does not. 
    
16 
Figure 4 illustrates this low correlation by presenting a scatter plot of the ranks of the 306 
HRRs (higher numbers represent more spending) in terms of total spending per Medicare and per 
privately insured beneficiary. We have made the points for Grand Junction, Colorado, La Crosse, 
Wisconsin, and Rochester, Minnesota, more prominent than the others. These three HRRs have 
been highlighted by policy-makers as regions with low Medicare spending that could serve as 
best practice models for the nation. 30  While Grand Junction is the third-lowest HRR for 
Medicare spend per beneficiary in 2011, it is the forty-third highest-spending HRR for privately 
insured beneficiaries (and the ninth highest average inpatient prices) in 2011. Similarly, 
Rochester, Minnesota has the fourteenth lowest spending per Medicare beneficiary, the eleventh 
highest spending per privately insured beneficiary, and the thirty-third highest average inpatient 
prices in the nation.31 Finally, for 2011, La Crosse, Wisconsin has the lowest total spending per 
Medicare beneficiary and the twenty-second highest spending per privately insured beneficiary. 
A scatter plot for inpatient spending only is presented in Figure A4. It looks much the same as 
the scatter plot for total spending. To further illustrate, in Table A4 we list ten areas that have 
low spending for both Medicare and the privately insured and ten areas with high spending for 
both. This highlights the fact that case studies from Medicare do not easily generalize to the 
privately insured.32 
 
IV.B The Contributions of Price vs. Quantity to Spending Variation 
We are interested in determining the extent to which variation in the price of care across 
HRRs or the quantity of care provided across HRRs contributes to the national variation in 
                                                        
30 For examples of the discussion of Grand Junction, Colorado, La Crosse, Wisconsin, and Rochester, Minnesota by 
policy-makers, see Obama (2009a), Obama (2009b), Gawande (2009), Gawande et al. (2009), and Nichols, 
Weinberg, and Barnes (2009). For example, in a 2009 speech, President Obama said, “Now here -- if you don't -- I 
know there's some skepticism:  Well, how are you going to save money in the health care system?  You're doing it 
here in Grand Junction.  You know -- you know that lowering costs is possible if you put in place smarter 
incentives; if you think about how to treat people, not just illnesses; if you look at problems facing not just one 
hospital or physician, but the many system-wide problems that are shared.  That's what the medical community in 
this city did, and now you're getting better results while wasting less money.  And I know that your senator, Michael 
Bennet, has been working hard on legislation that's based on putting the innovations that are here in Grand Junction 
into practice across the system, and there's no reason why we can't do that” (Obama 2009a). 
31 A scatter plot of 2011 spending per privately insured beneficiary and spending per Medicare beneficiary with axis 
in dollars is presented in Figure A4. 
32 In Figures A5 and A6, we present scatter plots of risk-adjusted spending per Medicare beneficiary and spending 
per privately insured beneficiary in dollars. Figure A6 presents total spending per beneficiary; Figure A6 presents 
inpatient spending per beneficiary.  
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inpatient spending for the privately insured and the Medicare population. To do so, we first 
calculate inpatient spending per beneficiary for the privately insured and for Medicare recipients. 
Inpatient spending per beneficiary in HRR r (yr) is a function of the quantity (qr) of care 
provided and the price of care (pr): 




where Br is the number of beneficiaries in HRR r and ∑ℎ,𝑑 indicates summing across all DRGs 
in a hospital and the all hospitals in an HRR. The price of DRG d at hospital h in HRR r is 
represented by ph,d and quantity is qh,d (we suppress the subscript r for economy of notation).  
We now compute counterfactuals to calculate the relative contributions of price and 
quantity to variation in inpatient spending. The first counterfactual we create is to fix all prices 
per DRG to be the same as the national average (?̅?𝑑) and then analyze spending variation. This 
allows us to identify the relative contribution that differences in the quantity of care provided 
across regions make to variation in spending per beneficiary. Spending per beneficiary calculated 
with national average prices is (where ~ indicates a counterfactual calculation):  
(5)               ?̃?𝑟
?̅?𝑑 = ∑ (?̅?𝑑𝑞ℎ,𝑑)ℎ,𝑑 𝐵𝑟 . 
The second counterfactual is to fix the quantity and mix of inpatient care delivered in 
each HRR to be the same as the national average mix and quantity of care (?̅?𝑑) and then analyze 
spending variation.33 To do so, we calculate:  
(6)      ?̃?𝑟
?̅?𝑑 = ∑ (?̅?𝑑𝑝ℎ,𝑑)ℎ,𝑑 𝐵𝑟 . 
This allows us to identify the relative contribution that differences in price make to variation in 
spending per beneficiary across HRRs. These are, of course, purely accounting decompositions 
to gauge rough magnitudes, as quantity and price are both endogenously determined in the 
private sector. 
Table 4 contains the results of these counterfactual calculations. We present means and 
standard deviations of the inpatient spending measures and a number of measures of dispersion: 
the coefficient of variation, the Gini coefficient, and the 90th-10th percentile range. Column (1) of 
Table 4 presents the raw spending per beneficiary for the privately insured, which has a mean of                                                         
33 To do so, we identify the mix of DRGs at a national level and set every HRR to have that mix of DRGs.  
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$793, a standard deviation of $348, and a coefficient of variation of 0.44. Note that the 
dispersion in spending for the privately insured is higher than that in the Medicare population 
(column (6)). Column (2) illustrates that when prices are fixed nationally, the coefficient of 
variation is reduced to 0.32. The Gini coefficient falls from 0.20 to 0.15 and the 90th-10th 
percentile range falls from 1.85 to 1.64. The effects of fixing quantity are in columns (4) and (5). 
As can be seen, the impact of fixing quantity on the coefficient of variation is about the same as 
that of fixing price. The impact on the Gini coefficient is smaller, and the impact on the 90th-10th 
percentile range is smaller still. These results imply that for the privately insured, prices play a 
bigger (or at least as big) a role as quantity in accounting for the dispersion of spending. 
Column (6) of Table 4 presents the raw inpatient spending per Medicare beneficiary, 
which has a mean of $3,704, a standard deviation of $1,281, and a coefficient of variation of 
0.35. Column (7) presents the results of holding prices fixed across HRRs. This does not 
substantially reduce the variation in Medicare spending. The coefficient of variation falls from 
0.35 to 0.30. The Gini coefficient only falls from 0.18 to 0.17, and the 90th-10th percentile range 
falls slightly from 1.81 to 1.72. In contrast, fixing quantity (column (9)) and allowing price to be 
the only factor driving spending variation reduces the coefficient of variation by almost half, 
from 0.35 to 0.18. Similarly the Gini coefficient falls from 0.18 to 0.10. Consistent with the 
existing literature, these results illustrate that the quantity of health care delivered is the primary 
reason for variation in health care spending for Medicare beneficiaries across HRRs. The news 
from our analysis is that this is decidedly not the case for the privately insured. 
Figure 5 presents the decomposition graphically. Panel A shows the distribution of 
inpatient spending per privately insured beneficiary using the raw data (solid blue line), when 
prices are fixed (small hashed red line), and when volume is fixed (bigger hashed red line). As 
Panel A illustrates, fixing price and fixing quantity have roughly the same effect on reducing 
inpatient spending per beneficiary for the privately insured. In contrast, Panel B shows that 
fixing the quantity of care provided across markets substantially reduces the variation in 
inpatient spending per Medicare beneficiary.34  
34 We also calculate counterfactuals for individual years 2008 through 2010. These are qualitatively similar and are 
available upon request from the authors. In addition, we also look at the correlation of Medicare spending and 
spending on the privately insured in our samples where price is fixed. This approximates the correlation between the 
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We also developed an alternative approach for understanding the role of price and 
quantity for driving spending by decomposing the natural log of spending per beneficiary into 
the variances of the ln(price), ln(quantity), and a covariance term (details are in Appendix B  and 
Table A5). This has the advantage of being an exact decomposition. The qualitative results from 
this exercise are very similar to results from our earlier decomposition presented in Table 4.35  
V. National-Level and Within HRR Variation in Health Care Providers’ Prices
V.A Private Price Variation across HRRs 
Figure 6 presents maps of (risk and inflation-adjusted) private-payer inpatient prices 
averaged 2008 to 2011.36 Panel A presents risk-adjusted prices, and Panel B normalizes risk-
adjusted prices using the Medicare wage index. There is substantial variation in prices across 
geographic areas, even after risk-adjustment. As Panel B illustrates, normalizing prices using the 
local Medicare wage index does little to reduce this variation. To illustrate the extent of the 
variation, Santa Rosa, California has the highest average inpatient private-payer prices and is 
more than four times as expensive as the least expensive HRR (Montgomery, Alabama). Within 
the state of Texas, all five quintiles of the price distribution are represented.  
The seven procedures we examine in this analysis also display substantial variation.37 
The private-payer price ratio of the most expensive to the least expensive hospital prices across 
the nation for knee replacements, hip replacements, vaginal deliveries, cesarean deliveries, 
PTCAs, colonoscopies, and MRIs are 8.04, 7.84, 6.91, 7.40, 6.13, 9.49, and 11.99, respectively. 
In contrast, the Medicare base payment rate is allowed by CMS to vary by a factor of 2.26 across 
the U.S.  
spending that results from the quantity of care provided in each market. The correlation between price fixed 
spending at the HRR-level between Medicare and the privately insured is 0.428.  
35 Results from the formal decomposition illustrate that, for the privately insured, 46 percent of variation is driven by 
price, 36 percent by quantity, and 18 percent by an interaction term. For Medicare only 9 percent of the variation is 
driven by price, 77 percent is driven by the quantity of care delivered and 14 percent is captured by an interaction 
term. 
36  Prices are put in 2011 dollars using the All Items Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers, 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ 
37 Maps of procedure-level average prices per HRR are available online at healthcarepricingproject.org 
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We now examine price variation within geographic areas. Table 5 presents the within 
HRR coefficients of variation in private-payer prices for the twenty-five most populated HRRs in 
the HCCI data in 2011 for our inpatient price index and the seven procedures. The national 
average of the within HRR coefficient of variation is in the final row and ranges between 0.197 
(vaginal delivery) to 0.289 (MRI). It is striking that the within-HRR coefficient of variation is 
largest for lower-limb MRI, the least differentiated procedure in our analysis. Indeed, the 
variation is such that if, rather than attending their current provider, each patient paying above 
median for any inpatient service in their HRR chose to attend the hospital with the median price 
for their DRG, it would result in a reduction in inpatient spending for the privately insured of 
20.3 percent.38  
In Figure 7 we show the extensive within-HRR variation in private-payer prices for knee 
replacement, lower-limb MRI, and PTCA in three example cities: Denver, Atlanta, and 
Columbus.39 In Denver, the ratio of maximum to minimum provider average prices is 3.09, 2.83, 
and 2.87, respectively, for knee replacement, PTCA, and MRI. In Atlanta, these ratios are 6.10, 
2.52, and 3.77, and in Columbus, they are 2.77, 2.12, and 6.65, respectively. It is worth noting 
that for all three surgical procedures, there is virtually no variation in Medicare’s administered 
payments across providers within HRRs. We observe similar levels of variation when we include 
hospital and physician fees.  
VI. Factors Associated with Variation in Provider Prices
VI.A What Explains Providers’ Price variation?
The most important hospital cost shifter is geographic variation in wages, since labor is 
the largest component of hospital costs (Edmunds and Sloan 2012). To account for these 
differences, CMS adjusts Medicare hospital payments using a hospital wage index, which is 
calculated based on a hospital’s metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or statewide non-MSA. In 
38 To create this calculation, we took data for 2011. We identified the median DRG-price per HRR. For any patient 
who paid a price per DRG over the median, we substituted the median price for their true price and then recalculated 
average spending per beneficiary. This counterfactual ignores behavioral responses. 
39 We produced within market graphs for all seven procedures in all HRRs with five or more providers. Within 
market graphs for our sever procedures in Atlanta, Georgia, Columbus, Ohio, Denver, Colorado, Houston, Texas, 
Manhattan, New York, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, are presented in Figures A7 through A13. The within market 
graphs for the remaining HRRs with five or more providers is accessible at www.healthcarepricingproject.org.  
V.B Within HRR Variation in Health Care Providers’ Prices
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addition, a hospital’s base rate is adjusted to attempt to compensate hospitals for the additional 
costs associated with teaching activity and treatment of indigent patients. 40  For example, 
Medicare reimbursed Stanford Hospital, in Palo Alto, California $12,699.13 in 2011 for a stroke 
with complications (MS-DRG 065) and reimbursed the Medical Center Enterprise in Enterprise, 
Alabama, $5,365.09 for the same episode.41  
Price variation may also reflect variation in hospital quality. Quality is likely both a cost 
and a demand shifter. Higher quality requires greater investments or greater effort, both of which 
are costly. In addition, we expect patients to be attracted to better hospitals (Chandra et al. 2015). 
There is evidence of substantial (two to threefold) variation in hospital mortality rates, 
readmission rates, and complication rates across hospitals (Yale  Center for Outcomes Research 
and Evaluation 2013).42 Hospitals also differ substantially in non-clinical domains, e.g., in the 
availability of technology, “hotel-style” amenities, and reputation (which may be based on 
clinical quality). However, there is little academic evidence showing strong correlations between 
prices and clinical quality.43  
There are a number of other hospital characteristics that may also affect price, either by 
increasing demand or by increasing costs. These factors include the number of high tech services 
a hospital provides, which are certainly costly and may also attract patients. In addition, hospital 
characteristics such as ownership type and teaching status may affect costs or demand, and 
therefore prices. Not-for-profit, for-profit, and public hospitals have different tax liabilities, and 
ownership type may also affect incentives and therefore costs. In addition, ownership type may 
serve as a signal to consumers about trustworthiness or quality.44 Similarly, teaching hospitals 
40  These adjustments are the indirect medical education (IME) adjustment and disproportionate share (DSH) 
payments. 
41 See Edmunds and Sloan (2012) for details on the differences in how these two hospitals are paid. CMS assumes 
that 68.8 percent of the Stanford Hospital’s costs are labor and assigns them a wage index of 1.6379. They assume 
62.0 percent of costs for Medical Center Enterprise come from labor and assigned them a wage index of 0.7436.  
42 Mortality rates for general and vascular surgery vary by a factor of two from 3.5 to 7 percent (Ghaferi, Birkmeyer, 
and Dimick 2009); Rogowski, Staiger, and Horbar (2004) found that risk-adjusted 28-day mortality in neonates 
varied three-fold across hospitals.  
43 White, Reschovsky, and Bond (2014) find that high priced hospitals in the Midwest have higher U.S. News & 
World Report rankings, but not better-observed measures of clinical quality. 
44  See Sloan (2000) for a survey of the literature on not-for-profits in health care. Overall, while there may 
theoretically be differences as indicated, the empirical literature for the most part does not find significant 
differences in costs or quality.  
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likely have higher costs than non-teaching hospitals, and consumers may view teaching status as 
a signal of quality.  
Hospital size, measured as the number of beds, is known to affect costs through scale 
economies (Carey 1997; Gaynor, Kleiner, and Vogt 2013; Vita 1990). Further, there is a well-
documented relationship between hospital volume of surgical procedures and patient outcomes, 
so hospital size may also be associated with the quality of care (Birkmeyer et al. 2002; Gaynor, 
Seider, and Vogt 2005). Moreover, larger hospitals may have more negotiating power over their 
transaction prices with insurers (Ho 2009; Sorenson 2003).  
Population characteristics such as county-level insurance coverage and average county-
level income may affect demand and are thereby candidates to affect price. Insurance lowers the 
cost of care to the patient, so we expect greater coverage to increase demand.  
Market power is another important candidate that potentially affects price variation. 
Hospital markets are likely to be characterized by provider and insurer market power. There have 
been over 1,200 hospital mergers and acquisitions in the US since 1994, leading to a dramatic 
increase in concentration during this period (Dafny 2014), so much so that most large urban 
areas are dominated by one to three large hospital systems. As a consequence, hospitals, 
particularly those in highly concentrated markets, likely have substantial bargaining power 
relative to insurers.45 Therefore, we construct a number of measures of hospital market structure 
such as indicators for the number of hospitals (monopoly, duopoly, etc.). Similarly, we also 
construct several proxies for the concentration of insurers, since insurers with more market 
power could negotiate lower prices from providers (Ho and Lee 2015).  
Variation in hospitals’ private-payer prices may also be affected by changes in the 
Medicare market. There are a number of hypotheses as to how Medicare may affect private 
prices. Some have hypothesized that hospitals engage in “cost shifting,” i.e., providers respond to 
decreases in Medicare and Medicaid payments by increasing their prices to private-payers (Frakt 
2011). However, the empirical evidence for cost shifting is quite mixed.46 An alternative view is 
45 There is also a wide literature which has found that hospital concentration raises prices (Gaynor, Ho, and Town 
2015). 
46 There is very mixed empirical evidence for cost shifting. Cutler (1998) examines changes in Medicare payment 
policy and finds dollar for dollar cost shifts in the 1980s. However, he finds no evidence of cost shifting in response 
to Medicare price cuts in the 1990s. Wu (2010) studies the impact of payment changes in Medicare introduced by 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1998. She finds that a $1 reduction in Medicare payments increased hospital payments 
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that hospitals negotiate their private prices based on Medicare payments. This “cost following” 
model implies that pricing of privately funded services is positively related to Medicare. This 
could occur because hospitals use public reimbursement rates as a benchmark to set their own 
rates due to the complexity of setting prices in isolation (Clemens and Gottlieb 2013). 47 
Alternatively, hospitals that treat predominantly publicly funded patients may optimize their 
overall production to be profitable with Medicare or Medicaid payments.48 This may lead them 
to have lower private-payer prices (Stensland, Gaumer, and Miller 2010).  
VI.B Data on Factors Influencing Price
Hospital Characteristics and Hospitals’ Local Area Characteristics: In our price 
regressions, we include controls for hospital characteristics drawn from the AHA annual survey: 
the number of hospital beds, ownership type (not-for-profit, for-profit, government), teaching 
status, and indicators for the technologies available at a hospital in a specific year. In addition, 
we link hospitals’ zip codes to local area characteristics from the Census Bureau’s Small Area 
Health Insurance Estimates and Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, including the 
proportions of the population who are uninsured and the median income in the county where the 
hospital is located.  
Technology Index: We follow Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) in using a count of 
hospital technologies offered by a hospital as recorded in the AHA survey data. The AHA data 
include binary indicators for whether a hospital has various technologies and services, such as 
computer-tomography (CT) scanners, electron beam computed tomography, or proton beam 
therapy. A full list of these technologies is available in Table A6. We sum the number of these 
technologies available at each hospital in each year.  
by $0.21 cents on the dollar (Wu, 2010). In addition, Wu (2010) finds that hospitals with greater market power were 
able to make larger private price increases in response to cuts in public reimbursement rates. Along the same lines, 
Dranove, Garthwaite, and Ody (2013) analyze hospitals’ responses to negative financial shocks to their endowments 
from the most recent recession. They find that, on average, hospitals do not respond to negative financial shocks by 
raising prices, but that highly ranked hospitals are able to respond to negative financial shocks by raising prices.  
47 Clemens and Gottlieb (2013) study the impact of changes in Medicare payments on physician prices by exploiting 
a change in payment policy that made physician payments more generous for surgical procedures. They find that a 
$1 increase in Medicare payment results in a $1.20 dollar increase in private-payer physician prices. These 
Medicare/private-payer price transmissions are highest in markets where there is low provider consolidation. 
Similarly,White (2013) finds that markets with high growth in Medicare payments from 1995 through 2009 also 
have high growth in private-payer prices.  
48 Medicaid is another important government insurance program that mainly covers low-income individuals. 
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Hospital Quality: To capture reputational quality, we include a yearly indicator for 
whether or not a hospital was ranked by the U.S. News & World Report as a top hospital. We 
indicate a hospital was ranked in the U.S. News and World Report if it was ranked as an overall 
top hospital or received a ranking as a top hospital for cancer care; gastrointestinal care; ear nose 
and throat; geriatric care; gynecology; cardiology; orthopedics; rheumatology; or urology. In 
total, from 2008 through 2011, the U.S. News & World Report ranked 231 hospitals in our 
sample in their annual ‘Best Hospital’ rankings across clinical specialties and the overall ranking. 
To measure clinical performance, we merge in data on hospital quality from 
https://data.medicare.gov/, which includes the hospital quality scores reported publicly on the 
CMS Hospital Compare webpage (https://medicare.gov/hospitalcompare). These include 
measures of patient safety, patient outcomes, and process measures of care captured from public 
and private claims data. We included rankings for 2008 through 2011 for four measures: the 
percentage of heart attack patients given aspirin upon arrival to the hospital; the percentage of 
surgery patients given an antibiotic prior to surgery; the percentage of patients treated within 
twenty-four hours of surgery to prevent blood clots; and the 30-day risk adjusted mortality from 
heart attacks.49 These are widely acknowledged measures of the quality of care and they are all 
available with the greatest frequency for hospitals in our sample from 2008 through 2011 (Yale  
Center for Outcomes Research and Evaluation 2013). Nevertheless, we do not have CMS quality 
measures for 168 hospitals (7.5 percent) from our inpatient sample. As a result, we present 
analysis of these measures separately from our main analysis. In our analysis, we break quality 
scores into quartiles and report the relationship between price and being a hospital being ranked 
in the lowest performing quartile of quality. 
Hospital Market Structure: We construct our measures of market structure in a two-step 
process. The first step is to define a hospital’s market area.50 We define both fixed- and variable-
radius markets. For our fixed-radius markets, we draw a radius around each hospital, which 
places hospitals in the center of circular markets of radius z. We construct hospital markets using 
five-mile, ten-mile, fifteen-mile, and thirty-mile radii extending outwards from hospitals’ 
49  For the technical descriptions of the measures of performance we used in this analysis, see 
http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/Data/Measures.html. 
50 These are approximations to hospitals’ geographic markets, not precise antitrust markets. Since these are not 
precise markets, we test the robustness of our results to various market delineations and find that we obtain the same 
results.   
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locations.51 Previous analysis of Medicare beneficiaries found that 80 percent of patients were 
admitted to hospitals within ten miles of their home (Tay 2003). We generally report statistics for 
markets with a radius z of fifteen-miles drawn around each hospital, so that we capture the travel 
distance of most patients. We illustrate our results are robust to using radii of longer and shorter 
distances. The second step is to measure market structure within our defined market areas. We 
do so in two ways. First, we identify whether the geographically defined markets are 
monopolies, duopolies, triopolies, or include four or more providers. Second, we calculate either 
counts of hospitals or Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes (HHIs) calculated within our various 
market definitions.  
The HHI for each hospital-centered market is: 
(7)     𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑚,𝑡 =  ∑ (𝑠ℎ,𝑡𝑚 )2𝐻ℎ=1 , 
where Hospital HHIm,t is concentration in market m at time t, where 𝑠ℎ,𝑡𝑚  is the market share of 
hospital h in market m at time t, calculated using hospital bed count.52  
There are well-known endogeneity concerns about the use of concentration measures in 
pricing equations (e.g., Bresnahan 1989). For example, higher quality hospitals may attract more 
patients and have higher market shares, resulting in a higher HHI for their market. Since they 
will likely also have higher prices, this can lead to an estimated positive relationship between 
price and concentration driven by omitted quality scores rather than by market power. It is also 
possible that hospitals with higher shares may be lower cost, which could create a negative 
association between price and concentration, again due to an omitted variable. This may be less 
of a problem in this application, since we have a number of observable measures of quality and 
of cost. Nonetheless, the estimates should be interpreted as associations, not causal effects.53  
51 We also calculate a variable radius market where the radius that defines a hospitals’ market is a function of the 
urban-rural classification defined by the US census. Hospitals located in ‘large urban’ areas are assigned a market 
defined by a ten-mile radius; hospitals located in ‘urban’ have a market defined around them using a fifteen-mile 
radius; and hospitals located in ‘rural’ areas have a market defined around them using a twenty-mile radius. For 
details on the census definitions, see: https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/uafaq.html. 
52 We also compute HHIs using hospital discharges and total days of care delivered. All measures are correlated at 
over 98 percent.  
53 Kessler and McClellan (2000) propose one strategy to mitigate endogeneity by using a choice model to predict 
patient flows and then calculate market concentrations using predicted rather than actual patient flows. We cannot 
use this strategy because we do not see every patient treated at each hospital; we only see patients at a hospital who 
are insured by one of the three payers in our dataset. Moreover, as Cooper et al. (2011) note, fixed-radius HHIs 
measured using actual patient flows are correlated at over 0.90 with Kessler and McClellan (2000) style predicted 
flow HHIs. Instead, we measure hospital market size and hospital market share based on the total number of beds 
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Insurance Market Structure: There are limited data and few reliable sources of 
information on market concentration in the health insurance industry (Dafny et al. 2011). The 
most reliable data with coverage of the entire country are only available at the state level. We 
construct state-level measures of insurance market concentration using data from the Center for 
Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) at CMS. Under regulations created in the 
Affordable Care Act, insurance companies are required to report data on the number of 
beneficiaries per state that they cover in the small, medium, and large group markets.54 We use 
these data to construct insurance market concentration as 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑠 =  ∑ (𝑠𝑖𝑠)2𝐼𝑖=1 , where 𝑠𝑖𝑠 
is insurer i’s market share of enrollment in state s in 2011.55 Because the CCIIO data are only 
available from 2011 onwards, we apply the 2011 state insurance HHIs to 2008, 2009, and 2010.   
In order to construct a sub-state level of insurer negotiating strength, we use the share of 
total privately insured lives at the county level covered by the three insurers in our HCCI data.  
We use data on the total number of privately insured lives at the country level from the Census 
Bureau’s Small Area Health Insurance Estimates and calculate the share of those covered lives 
that received insurance coverage from the HCCI payers annually. Although this does not capture 
all private insurers like the CCIIO data, the measure is both county specific and is most relevant 
for the prices negotiated with the HCCI insurers (our dependent variable). 
Medicare and Medicaid: We include the Medicare base payment rate for hospitals, as 
described previously, since this may proxy for hospital costs. In addition, the hospital cost-
shifting hypothesis is that lower Medicare prices should lead to higher private prices. The cost 
following hypothesis is that higher Medicare prices lead to higher private prices. All of these are 
encompassed by including the Medicare base payment rate. The hospital’s shares of patients that 
are Medicare and Medicaid are included to capture whether hospitals with large Medicare or 
Medicaid patient populations price services differently for the privately insured. 
within a market and a facility, respectively. We also note that the number of hospital beds is a measure potentially 
less subject to endogeneity than patient flows because it is costly for hospitals to alter the number of beds.  
54 These data are used by the federal government, together with data on insurers’ spending on their beneficiaries, to 
calculate medical loss ratios. The CCIIO data only include fully insured plans, which face medical loss reporting 
requirements from the federal government (as opposed to self-insured plans). 
55 In addition to measuring insurance market concentration using data from CCIIO, we also use data from 2008 
through 2011 from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. 
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We first examine simple patterns in the data by looking at bivariate correlations between 
the potential drivers identified above and prices. Figure 8 presents these correlations graphically. 
Clearly, hospitals in monopoly and duopoly markets have higher prices. There is a small 
negative but insignificant correlation between state-level insurer HHI and price. However, prices 
are lower in counties where HCCI insurers have a higher share of covered lives.  Hospitals with 
more technologies, those that are ranked by the U.S. News & World Report, larger hospitals, and 
teaching hospitals all have higher prices. Government hospitals have lower prices than for-profits 
(with not-for-profits in between). Both the proportion of the county that is uninsured and the 
county median income are positively correlated with price. Hospitals with higher Medicare base 
payment rates have substantially higher private-payer prices. Hospitals with higher shares of 
Medicare patients have lower prices, although hospitals with higher Medicaid shares have 
somewhat higher prices. We find the expected correlations between four measures of quality and 
inpatient hospital prices. Here, our quality indicators indicate that a hospital was in the worst 
performing quartile of hospitals on that quality score. Hospitals in the worst performing quartile 
based on the percentage of patients given aspirin at arrival, percent of surgery patients treated to 
prevent blood clots, and thirty-day risk-adjusted AMI mortality all have lower prices. There is a 
small negative, but not precise, correlation for hospitals in the worst performing quartile based 
on the percentage of patients given an antibiotic one hour before surgery to prevent an infection. 
The correlations in Figure 8 illustrate the underlying (bivariate) patterns in the data. In 
what follows, we estimate these relationships using multiple regression analysis. We find that 
most of the patterns illustrated here are largely sustained in the regression results.  
VI.D Factors Associated with Providers’ Inpatient Private-Payer Prices
Econometric Approach. To examine the factors associated with hospital prices we run 
OLS regressions on 2008 through 2011 hospital prices.56 Our basic regressions are of the form:  
(8)  ln(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸ℎ,𝑚,𝑟,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡) = 𝐻𝑚,𝑡𝛼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑠 +  𝜑𝑆𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑍ℎ,𝑡𝛾 + 𝐷𝑐,𝑡𝜃 + 𝑀ℎ,𝑡𝜇 +  𝜏𝑡 +  𝑢ℎ,𝑚,𝑟,𝑠,𝑡, 
where PRICE is the adjusted hospital price (?̂?ℎ,𝑡), as described in equation (2) and is measured 
for hospital h, in hospital market m, in HRR r, in county c, in state s, in year t. We also estimate 
56 We exclude 2007 from our analysis because our price indexes require six months of a patient’s medical history to 
generate the Charlson Index we use for risk-adjustment.  
VI.C Bivariate Correlations of Price
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equation (8) with prices for each of the seven procedures as the dependent variable. A key 
variable of interest is hospital market structure (H), measured using dummies for market type 
(monopoly, duopoly, and triopoly), HHIs, or hospital counts. We also include state level HHIs of 
insurers (𝐼𝑠) and a county level measure of the percent of privately insured lives covered by the 
HCCI insurers (Sc,t) as controls for insurers’ bargaining power with hospitals. 𝑍ℎ,𝑡 is a vector of 
hospital characteristics. This includes proxies for hospital quality measured by U.S. News & 
World Report and quality scores from the Medicare Hospital Compare webpage, the technology 
index, hospital size, and indicators for whether a hospital is a teaching facility, government-
owned facility, or a not-for-profit. 𝐷𝑐,𝑡  contains the demand shifters: the median income of a 
hospital’s county and the percent of the population who are uninsured in the county. 𝑀ℎ𝑡 
contains the Medicare base payment rate, the share of hospitals’ discharges that are Medicare 
patients, and the share of a hospitals’ discharges that are Medicaid patients. Year fixed effects 
are denoted by 𝜏𝑡, and in some specifications we also include HRR fixed effects, 𝛿ℎ. The error 
terms are clustered by HRR. In our analysis, we estimate equation (8) using the natural log of 
hospital prices and the natural log of our continuous, independent variables.57 
 Results of The Private-Payer Inpatient Hospital Price Index Regressions: Table 6 
contains OLS estimates of equation (8) where the dependent variable is the logged inpatient price 
index (or the charge in column (4)). Column (1) includes indicators for hospital market structure 
(monopoly, duopoly, and triopoly), hospital characteristics, information on public payers, local 
area characteristics, and year dummies. We consistently find that find that prices decline 
monotonically as the number of rival hospitals per market increases. The point estimates in 
Column (1) imply that being in a monopoly market is associated with 26.1 percent (= 𝑒0.232 − 1) 
higher prices relative to markets with four or more hospitals.  In column (2), we add HRR fixed 
effects, so our measures of market structure are estimated using only within HRR variation. 
Here, we also find that being in a monopoly is associated with a significant price premium, 
although the coefficient falls from 0.232 to 0.169. In column (3), in addition to HRR fixed 
effects, we add in two controls for insurance market structure (insurer HHI at the state level and 
HCCI share at the county level). We find that hospitals in monopoly duopoly, and triopoly                                                         
57 In all specifications we add one to continuous right hand side variables before taking logs as there are a small 
number of zeroes.  
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markets are associated with statistically significant price increases of respectively 15.3 percent, 
6.4 percent, and 4.8 percent relative to markets with four or more hospitals. 58  Note these 
correlations are robust to specifications using alternative measures of market concentration such 
as continuous or discretized HHIs and/or counts of hospitals in markets of several geographic 
sizes.59  
The coefficients on the two insurer concentration measures in column (3) of Table 6 take 
their expected negative signs, but only the share of the privately insured in each county that 
receive coverage from the HCCI insurers is significant. When HCCI insurers account for a larger 
share of a county’s insured population, the HCCI insurers likely have increased negotiating 
power. A 10 percent increase in the HCCI insurers’ share is associated with a 1.4 percent 
decrease in hospital prices. The insignificance of insurers’ HHI is likely to be because the state 
level is too highly aggregated to adequately proxy insurer market concentration.  
Turning to the covariates reflecting quality, both the technology index and whether the 
hospital was publicly ranked as a high performer have positive and significant coefficients. Our 
point estimates in column (3) in Table 6 imply that doubling the number of technologies at a 
hospital is associated with a 1 percent increase in price. Being ranked as a top hospital by U.S. 
News & World Report is associated with a significant price premium of 12.7 percent. Bigger 
hospitals also have higher prices. Interestingly, teaching hospitals, which are often thought of as 
higher quality and had a significant price premium in the bivariate correlations of Figure 8, are 
not significantly associated with higher prices when other characteristics are included as 
                                                        
58  The results are robust to other ways of measuring price. First, we obtain similar and precisely estimated 
coefficients when we include the sum of facilities and physician prices as our price variable, instead of just facilities 
prices. Second, we obtain similar results when we estimate the regression with price in levels instead of logs (see 
Table A7). For example, the magnitude of the coefficient on the monopoly dummy in column (3) of Table A7 
implies that prices are $1,524.50 higher in these markets. This 12.3 percent increase over the average inpatient price 
is similar to the 15.3 percent magnitude monopoly effect in our ln(price) regressions in column (3) in Table 6. Our 
results also remain qualitatively similar when we measure both the independent variables in levels instead of 
logarithms. 
59 Full results are in Table A8. We measure HHIs and vary the size of the radii that defines hospitals’ markets in first 
three columns. We also measure HHI in markets surrounding each hospital and define using radii that are larger in 
rural areas and smaller in urban areas; use counts instead of HHIs measured in fifteen mile radii markets; use 
dummy variables to indicate hospitals that are located in markets that are in the first, second, and third quartiles of 
HHIs measured in fifteen mile radii markets relative to the least concentrated quartile; and use a dummy to indicate 
hospitals are located in hospitals in the most concentrated quartile of HHI. The relationship between hospital market 
structure and price remains precisely measured and qualitatively unchanged across each measure of market 
structure. 
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controls. We discuss the impact of introduce the Medicare Hospital Compare quality scores in 
the next sub-section. 
We find significant associations of public payers with private prices. In particular, 
hospitals treating more Medicare patients have lower prices. Our estimates in column (3) of 
Table 6 imply that a 10 percent increase in the share of Medicare patients is associated with a 1 
percent reduction in inpatient hospital prices. Medicaid patient share is also negatively associated 
with private prices, but the effect is statistically insignificant. In the column (1) specification 
without HRR fixed effects, hospitals with higher Medicare reimbursement rates have higher 
prices (consistent with the idea of rates being a proxy for local wages costs). These are not 
significant when we include HRR fixed effects because Medicare payment rates do not vary 
much within HRRs.  
For-profit hospitals (the omitted base ownership form) have higher prices than 
government hospitals, but there is not a significant difference between the prices of for-profit and 
not-for-profit hospitals. The coefficients on the characteristics of the county population (percent 
uninsured, and median income) are precisely estimated in the absence of HRR fixed effects in 
column (1) and are associated with higher prices as expected, but become insignificant when 
HRR fixed effects and insurer controls are included. 
In column (4) of Table 6, we repeat the specification from column (3) but use the 
facilities charge (the list price) as the dependent variable instead of the transaction price. There 
are some large changes in coefficients in this specification. In particular the coefficient on being 
a hospital located in a monopoly market falls from a precisely estimated coefficient of 0.142 to 
negative and insignificant coefficient of -0.006. Although hospitals in concentrated markets do 
not seem to set significantly higher list prices, their actual transaction prices are significantly 
higher. Similarly, when using facilities charge as an outcome the coefficient on HCCI share 
becomes insignificant and the coefficient on non-profits becomes significant. This strongly 
suggests that using list prices, as is commonly done the literature, instead of actual transaction 
prices can generate a misleading pattern of correlations. 
Additional quality measures: In Table 7, we re-estimate the main inpatient price 
regression of Table 6, using indicators for whether or not a hospital was ranked in the lowest 
performing quartile of a series of CMS hospital quality measures as discussed above. Because 
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CMS cannot calculate quality scores for each hospital, we do not have quality scores for 8.6 
percent of our observations (7.5 percent of hospitals). As a result, we condition on the sub-
sample of hospitals from our inpatient sample that have non-missing values on all four quality 
measures. This change in the sample accounts for the minor change in the coefficients from 
column (3) of Table 6.  
Column (1) of Table 7 presents estimates of equation (8) with insurance market controls 
and HRR fixed effects, but does not include an important control for quality (i.e. including no 
control for a U.S. News & World Report Ranking). Columns (2) – (6) then add in each measure 
of quality separately and column (7) includes every measure of quality together. It is reassuring 
that including a battery of measures of hospital quality has essentially no impact on the market 
structure coefficients. If unobserved quality mattered a great deal, one would expect conditioning 
on observed quality to make a larger difference to the concentration coefficient. We find 
significant (albeit small) relationships for three out of four measures of quality and price. These 
suggest that being in the worst performing quartile of hospitals based on the share of patients 
with a heart attack given aspirin on admission to the hospital, being in the worst performing 
quartile of hospitals based on the percentage of patients given an antibiotic to prevent infection 
before surgery, and being in the worst performing quartile of hospitals based on the percentage 
of surgery patients given treatment to prevent blood clots have inpatient prices 4.4 percent, 3.1 
percent and 3.8 percent lower respectively than hospitals in the top three quartiles of clinical 
performance.60  
 Other robustness checks: We have conducted robustness checks on our functional form, 
market area definitions, and parameterization of equation (8). For example, to address the 
concern that there may be systematic differences in results in areas where the HCCI data has a 
higher (or lower) coverage of the privately insured, we re-estimate equation (8) on sub-samples 
where the HCCI insurers cover a high share and low share of the state’s population.61 The point 
estimates are qualitatively similar across the two samples and the hospital market structure                                                         
60 A version of Table 7 with coefficients and standard errors estimates for every covariate is presented on our 
webpage, www.healthcarepricingproject.org. 
61 All results in this paragraph are contained in Table A9. For each state, we measure the share of individuals with 
employer-sponsored insurance who receive coverage from the HCCI data contributors. States with high shares have 
HCCI coverage rates over the national median coverage rate. States with low shares have HCCI coverage rates 
below the national median coverage rate. 
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variables in the two samples are not statistically different from one another. In addition, we re-
estimated equation (8) on sub-samples where Blue Cross Blue Shield insurers have a high and 
low share of employer-sponsored coverage at the state-level. Again there were similar results 
across the samples. Finally, we were concerned that market structure may just proxy for a 
location in a rural area. Therefore, we present results where we estimate Equation (8) separately 
in urban and rural areas. We find that while hospital HHI is associated with higher hospital 
prices in urban areas, the relationship is insignificant in the rural sample. This is consistent with 
the fact that there is very little variation in hospital HHIs across rural areas.62 
 
VI.E Results for individual procedure prices: 
Table 8 presents our estimates using procedure level private-payer prices using the same 
specification presented in column (3) of Table 6 (Table A10 has results without HRR effects). 
Looking across the different procedures, it is striking that despite the smaller sample sizes (we 
condition on having a minimum number of ten cases per procedure per year, as discussed above), 
the results look qualitatively consistent with the overall inpatient results. For all procedures, we 
find that markets with a monopoly hospital have higher prices than those with four or more 
hospitals, and this positive association is significant at the 10% level or greater for five of the 
seven procedures. The point estimates imply that, at the procedure level, a hospital located in a 
monopoly market has prices that are between 8.7 percent and 18.9 percent higher than hospitals 
in markets with four or more hospitals. For example, being in a monopoly market is associated 
with having 18.9 percent higher prices for lower limb MRIs relative to markets with four or more 
hospitals.63  
We also re-estimate our procedure-level (and inpatient) regressions measuring prices as 
the sum of hospital and physician prices in Table A11. We do this because of the concern that 
sometimes these prices are bundled together (e.g. when the physicians are salaried employees of 
the hospitals). Our results are qualitatively similar using this measure of price.  
                                                        
62 The coefficient of variation in HHI in urban areas is 0.688. The coefficient of variation in HHI in rural areas is 
0.332.  
63 These results are robust when we include the four Medicare Hospital Compare quality scores into our estimators 
as controls.  
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The similarity of results using our seven detailed procedure prices in Table 8 compared to 




This paper analyzes the most comprehensive data to date on health spending on the privately 
insured and health care providers’ transaction prices. We find substantial variation in spending 
per privately insured beneficiary across the nation. Moreover, there is a low correlation (0.14) 
between private and Medicare spending per beneficiary across geographic areas (HRRs). 
Crucially, whereas the variation in Medicare spending is overwhelmingly due to differences in 
the quantity of care provided across HRRs, price variation across HRRs is the primary driver of 
spending variation for the privately insured. Hospitals’ negotiated transaction prices routinely 
vary by over a factor of eight or more across the nation and by a factor of three within HRRs. We 
observe this variation within and across HRRs for procedures like colonoscopy and lower-limb 
MRI that are fairly undifferentiated.  
We also find a large number of observable factors relating to costs and quality are 
systematically correlated with higher hospital prices. However, hospital market structure stands 
out as one of the most important factors associated with higher prices, even after controlling for 
costs and clinical quality. We find that hospitals located in monopoly markets have prices that 
are about 15.3 percent higher than hospitals located in markets with four or more providers. This 
result is robust across multiple measures of market structure and is consistent in states where the 
HCCI data contributors (and/or Blue Cross Blue Shield insurers) have high and low coverage 
rates.  
 We draw a number of conclusions for future research. First, information about Medicare 
spending and the factors that drive it to vary are of limited use in understanding health spending 
on the privately insured. There has been a general assumption both by policy-makers and in the 
literature that what we observe for Medicare broadly applies to spending on the privately 
insured. Our work shows that this is clearly not the case. Indeed, many geographic areas that 
have received public attention for being low spending on the Medicare population, such as Grand 
Junction, Colorado, La Crosse, Wisconsin, and Rochester, Minnesota, have high spending on the 
privately insured. Second, much more research is needed in order to analyze the spending and 
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prices facing the privately insured. Our work represents an initial foray into understanding the 
cross sectional variation in health care spending, but more work is needed to better understand 
the factors driving the growth in private spending over time. Third, it is important to assess the 
causal drivers of hospital transaction prices, particularly the role of provider market structure and 
public payment rates.  
In terms of policy, our work suggests that vigorous antitrust enforcement is important and 
that hospital prices could be made more transparent.  There is evidence that higher deductibles 
and cost sharing alone will not likely encourage shopping by patients (Brot-Goldberg et al. 
2015). However, more information, such as recent efforts in Massachusetts to make hospitals’ 
prices public, could help patients and their agents make more informed choices over treatment 
and put downward price pressure on more expensive hospitals in a sector of the economy where 
consumers (patients) presently know almost nothing about what they or their insurer will pay for 
care. Going forward, we believe that research advances using the kind of data described in this 
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Table 1: Annual Patients, Claims, and Spending From HCCI Data, 2007 - 2011 
          
     
 
Distinct Members Claims Inpatient Spending ($) Total Spending ($) 
2007 44,869,397 573,964,225 28,703,216,810 126,439,637,925 
2008 45,064,977 591,194,317 29,796,787,559 131,711,103,920 
2009 44,780,736 606,366,864 32,288,419,203 141,932,049,143 
2010 43,642,097 575,523,477 31,829,518,213 140,894,344,384 
2011 42,976,359 571,954,170 31,829,841,920 141,110,226,944 
Total 88,680,441 2,919,003,053 154,447,783,705 682,087,362,316 
 
Notes: This is from the entire HCCI database. All spending values have been inflation adjusted to 2011 dollars using 
the BLS All Items Consumer Price Index.  
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Table 2: Hospital and Patient Characteristics 
            
 
     
 
 Mean SD Min Max 
 
Hospital Characteristics     
 
Hospital in Monopoly Market, 15 Mile Radius 0.126 0.332 0 1 
 
Hospital in Duopoly Market, 15 Mile Radius 0.145 0.352 0 1 
 
Hospital in Triopoly Market, 15 Mile Radius 0.097 0.296 0 1 
 
Hospital HHI Defined by Beds in a 15 Mile Radius 0.416 0.292 0.041 1.000 
 
Insurer HHI Measured at the State Level 0.212 0.095 0.088 0.664 
 
HCCI Market Share Measured at the County Level 0.187 0.103 0.014 0.571 
 
Number of Technologies 60 30 0 138 
 
Ranked in US News & World Reports 0.059 0.236 0 1 
 
Beds 278 217 5 2,264 
 
Teaching Hospital 0.389 0.488 0 1 
 
Government Owned 0.106 0.308 0 1 
 
Non-Profit 0.683 0.465 0 1 
 
Local Area Characteristics     
 
Percent of County Uninsured 0.172 0.060 0.031 0.389 
 
Median Income 52,208 13,142 23,863 119,525 
 
Rural 0.127 0.333 0 1 
 
Other Payers     
 
Medicare Payment Rate 6,435 1,272 4,590 14,292 
 
Share Medicare 0.439 0.107 0.000 0.923 
 
Share Medicaid 0.183 0.100 0.000 0.950 
 
Quality Scores     
 
30-day AMI Survival Rate 0.840 0.016 0.751 0.898 
 
% of AMI Patients Given Aspirin at Arrival 0.978 0.041 0.330 1.000 
 
% of Patients Given Antibiotics 1 Hour Before Surgery 0.937 0.078 0.170 1.000 
 
% of Surgery Patients Given Treatment to Prevent Blood 
Clots Within 24 Hours 
0.885 0.102 0.030 1.000 
 
Patient Characteristics     
 
Age 18-24 0.074 0.261 0 1 
 
Age 25-34 0.274 0.446 0 1 
 
Age 35-44 0.203 0.402 0 1 
 
Age 45-54 0.208 0.406 0 1 
 
Age 55-64 0.241 0.428 0 1 
 
Female 0.699 0.459 0 1 
 
Charlson Comorbidity Index 0.521 1.201 0 6 
           
Notes: These are descriptive statistics for the inpatient sample from HCCI. There are 2,252 unique hospitals and 
3,544,320 unique patients.  
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Table 3: Private Prices and Medicare Base Payment Rate at the Hospital Level, 2008-2011  
 
 
                              
               
 
Summary Statistics   Correlation 
 































Inpatient 12,361 4,473 193 2,252 
 
1 
        Hip Replacement 24,046 7,444 6 477 
 
0.732 1 
       Knee Replacement 23,104 7,592 17 937 
 
0.760 0.932 1 
      Cesarean Section 7,612 2,511 7 1,113 
 
0.794 0.531 0.569 1 
     Vaginal Delivery 4,986 1,548 7 1,214 
 
0.715 0.531 0.506 0.866 1 
    PTCA 25,010 8,820 11 598 
 
0.691 0.602 0.598 0.408 0.345 1 
   Colonoscopy 1,694 624 9 1,195 
 
0.370 0.237 0.282 0.361 0.327 0.229 1 
  Lower Limb MRI 1,332 509 12 1,584 
 
0.423 0.275 0.305 0.295 0.246 0.347 0.307 1 
 Medicare Base 6,405 1,254 3 2,252 
 
0.165 0.217 0.144 0.232 0.298 0.059 0.091 -0.001 1 
                              
 
Notes: These are the regression corrected transaction prices as discussed in Section III and the Medicare base reimbursement averaged 2008-11 using inflation 
adjusted prices in 2011 dollars. Correlation coefficients are pairwise correlations between multiple procedures at the same hospital. The inpatient prices come 
from the inpatient sample (equation (2) in the text). The procedure prices come from the procedure samples (equation (3) in the text). The Max/Min is the ratio of 
the maximum national hospital price divided by the minimum hospital price.  
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Table 4: Counterfactual Measures of Medicare and Private Spending per Beneficiary, 2011, HRR Level 
 
                        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 





















































 Coefficient of 
Variation 0.44 0.32 -0.12 0.33 -0.11 
 
0.35 0.30 -0.04 0.18 -0.16 
Gini 0.20 0.15 -0.05 0.18 -0.02 
 
0.18 0.17 -0.01 0.10 -0.08 
p90/p10 1.85 1.64 -0.21 1.76 -0.09 
 
1.81 1.72 -0.09 1.39 -0.41 







                         
 
Notes: Counterfactuals are calculated at the HRR level using 2011 spending data—see section IV B for details of methodology. Spending is measured in 2011 
dollars and is drawn from the spending sample. Columns (1) and (6) present raw inpatient spending per beneficiary for the Medicare population and privately 
insured populations, respectively. Columns (2) and (7) present spending per privately insured and Medicare beneficiary when DRG-level prices are fixed to be 
the national average in all regions. Columns (3) and (8) report the reduction in measures of spending variation that result from fixing price. Columns (4) and (9) 
present spending per privately insured and Medicare beneficiary when the quantity of care (i.e. mix of DRG’s as well as rate at which beneficiaries are admitted 
across DRGs) is fixed to the national average. Columns (5) and (10) report the reductions in measures of spending variation that result from fixing quantity.  
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Table 5: Hospital Procedure Prices (Mean and Coefficient of Variation) for the 25 Most Populated HRRs, 2008-2011 
                                  














Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV 
                 Phoenix, AZ 13,322 0.511 16,220 0.101 20,160 0.405 7,183 0.255 5,156 0.313 16,419 0.408 1,730 0.592 1,161 0.621 
Los Angeles, CA 13,114 0.322 25,342 0.367 23,600 0.406 8,680 0.322 5,771 0.292 21,573 0.525 2,574 0.310 1,493 0.277 
Denver, CO 14,363 0.294 21,147 0.256 23,498 0.383 8,650 0.244 5,055 0.243 24,510 0.278 1,956 0.370 1,314 0.318 
Washington, DC 9,834 0.185 20,472 0.235 19,357 0.277 7,565 0.219 5,594 0.132 21,533 0.296 1,233 0.416 1,022 0.339 
Ft Lauderdale, FL 10,920 0.280 23,093 0.380 21,920 0.321 6,446 0.241 4,531 0.205 24,696 0.285 1,624 0.374 817 0.475 
Miami, FL 11,670 0.260 20,767 0.366 24,325 0.217 6,411 0.161 4,886 0.160 25,035 0.410 1,861 0.411 1,249 0.629 
Orlando, FL 12,874 0.259 23,884 0.284 22,841 0.280 7,717 0.172 4,574 0.284 24,503 0.412 2,046 0.301 1,270 0.285 
Atlanta, GA 10,473 0.248 23,081 0.243 20,797 0.317 6,082 0.255 4,295 0.247 19,709 0.256 1,653 0.449 1,034 0.347 
Louisville, KY 8,719 0.258 18,305 0.211 15,554 0.160 5,666 0.268 4,269 0.367 14,895 0.203 1,347 0.241 1,254 0.429 
Minneapolis, MN 12,778 0.172 23,054 0.208 22,111 0.184 8,463 0.199 4,918 0.123 23,584 0.121 1,543 0.185 1,348 0.368 
Kansas City, MO 9,943 0.263 18,540 0.330 18,967 0.256 6,029 0.239 4,053 0.207 21,259 0.289 1,430 0.174 1,165 0.313 
St. Louis, MO 9,285 0.335 15,456 0.073 14,581 0.136 4,934 0.261 3,975 0.396 18,129 0.191 1,208 0.211 1,182 0.302 
Camden, NJ 12,283 0.519 20,482 0.223 20,713 0.232 8,945 0.305 6,575 0.254 22,958 0.340 1,640 0.393 1,019 0.073 
E Long Island,NY  12,914 0.199 40,696 0.145 33,487 0.240 8,838 0.110 6,231 0.130 32,177 0.170 2,031 0.236 1,407 0.285 
Manhattan, NY 13,162 0.267 34,093 0.232 32,151 0.261 8,142 0.252 5,497 0.226 28,169 0.304 1,744 0.407 1,308 0.444 
Cincinnati, OH 11,057 0.132 24,628 0.108 22,896 0.127 6,426 0.033 4,488 0.084 22,093 0.131 1,744 0.147 1,211 0.457 
Columbus, OH 13,025 0.195 30,340 0.155 27,203 0.262 7,684 0.291 5,336 0.219 24,305 0.278 1,686 0.442 1,460 0.312 
Philadelphia, PA 12,047 0.311 28,100 0.252 25,213 0.292 9,233 0.281 6,286 0.260 28,553 0.260 1,945 0.339 1,681 0.486 
Austin, TX 10,664 0.316 23,618 0.200 23,203 0.157 6,465 0.077 4,605 0.051 28,614 0.215 1,378 0.247 1,091 0.339 
Dallas, TX 14,146 0.575 31,648 0.204 31,731 0.205 6,938 0.208 5,031 0.146 29,661 0.193 1,704 0.184 1,286 0.283 
Fort Worth, TX 13,379 0.265 40,935 0.064 34,720 0.218 6,948 0.135 5,279 0.157 28,723 0.228 1,591 0.191 1,220 0.349 
Houston, TX 12,208 0.538 27,682 0.283 23,151 0.305 6,322 0.203 4,145 0.265 30,108 0.290 1,373 0.321 1,218 0.421 
San Antonio, TX 14,072 0.657 29,767 0.154 23,871 0.198 6,511 0.331 3,181 0.264 22,374 0.163 1,245 0.240 1,055 0.283 
Arlington, VA 12,040 0.113 24,603 0.089 24,938 0.056 7,867 0.122 5,407 0.137 23,172 0.208 1,704 0.168 1,464 0.179 
Milwaukee, WI 12,853 0.143 24,421 0.150 24,256 0.157 8,518 0.153 5,100 0.111 25,089 0.242 2,395 0.208 1,539 0.247 
                 National Average 12,671 0.239 24,226 0.197 23,433 0.220 7,700 0.203 4,970 0.205 25,727 0.249 1,723 0.263 1,371 0.289 
Medicare Average 6,448 0.092 13,179 0.081 13,035 0.080 4,956 0.084 3,186 0.092 12,925 0.092 658 0.059 353 0.024 
                                  
Notes: Prices are averaged 2008-11 using inflation adjusted prices in 2011, drawn from our procedure samples, and are regression adjusted transaction prices. 
CoV = coefficient of variation. In regions where we only observe 1 provider, the standard deviation is undefined. Therefore, the national average CoV is 
calculated over regions with two or more providers. The national averages present the mean within HRR CoVs and the average within HRR price.   
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Table 6: Hospital Overall Inpatient Price Regression 
              
  
(1) (2) (3)   (4) 
 
Dependent 





     
 












































     
 








Ranked by US News 
and World Reports 








































     
 
















     
 
Ln Medicare Base 
Payment Rate 
































R-square 0.117 0.382 0.388 
 
0.555 
              
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation (8) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level 
in parentheses. Facilities prices are regression adjusted transaction prices. Facilities charges are regression adjusted list 
prices. All regressions include yearly fixed effects. The omitted ownership category is private hospitals.  
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Table 7: Inpatient Results with Multiple Measures of Quality 
                  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Dependent Variable Ln(Facilities Price) 
In bottom quartile of quality for: 
      
 
% AMI pats. given aspirin at 
arrival   
-0.043*** -0.037*** 
   
(0.009)    (0.009) 
 
% of surgery pats. given 
antibiotic 1 hour before surgery   
 -0.031***   -0.020** 
   
 (0.009)   (0.008) 
 
% of surgery pats. given 
treatment to prevent blood clots 
within 24 hours 
  
  -0.040***  -0.031*** 
   
  (0.010)  (0.009) 
 
30-day death rate for heart 
attack patients   
   -0.010 -0.007 
   
   (0.010) (0.010) 
Other Characteristics 
       
 
Monopoly 0.135*** 0.132*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.134*** 
  
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
 
Duopoly 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 
  
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
 
Triopoly 0.043 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.041 0.041 
  
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
 
Ln Insurer HHI -0.327 -0.336 -0.352 -0.332 -0.346 -0.338 -0.357 
  
(0.329) (0.327) (0.317) (0.326) (0.329) (0.327) (0.319) 
 
Ln Share HCCI -0.143*** -0.144*** -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.144*** 
  
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
 
Ranked in US News & World 
Reports  
0.139*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.133*** 
  
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
 
Ln Technologies 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.013*** 0.012** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
Observations 7,472 7,472 7,472 7,472 7,472 7,472 7,472 
 
R-Square 0.461 0.469 0.472 0.470 0.471 0.469 0.474 
                 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation (8) with the addition of alternative quality measures. Standard errors are clustered at the HRR-level 
and are in parentheses. Facilities prices are regression adjusted transaction prices. All regressions include HRR and yearly fixed effects. All regressions also include 
insurance market controls, controls for beds, teaching status, government ownership, non-profit status, percent county uninsured and median income, Medicare payment 
rates, and share of hospitals’ admits covered by Medicare and Medicaid (as in Table 6). Full results online at www.healthcarepricingproject.org.   
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Table 8: Procedure-level Regressions, 2008-2011 
                    
  
















        
 
Monopoly 0.142*** 0.096 0.137** 0.170*** 0.098** 0.113 0.083* 0.173*** 
  
(0.029) (0.096) (0.063) (0.054) (0.039) (0.119) (0.047) (0.037) 
 
Duopoly 0.062** -0.134 -0.082 0.019 0.017 0.147 0.077* 0.123*** 
  
(0.025) (0.081) (0.051) (0.048) (0.032) (0.099) (0.045) (0.032) 
 
Triopoly 0.047* 0.026 -0.006 0.018 0.015 0.103 0.080 0.114*** 
  
(0.028) (0.076) (0.063) (0.044) (0.036) (0.065) (0.052) (0.037) 
 
Ln Insurer HHI -0.249 -0.692 -0.704 -0.303 -0.612 -1.548** -0.530 -0.099 
  
(0.312) (0.608) (0.464) (0.426) (0.414) (0.710) (0.612) (0.445) 
 
Ln Share HCCI -0.138*** -0.168 -0.103 0.023 -0.057 -0.124 -0.064 -0.092** 
  
(0.034) (0.117) (0.078) (0.070) (0.058) (0.101) (0.056) (0.046) 
Hospital 
Characteristics 
        
 
Ln Technologies 0.009* -0.001 0.003 0.012* 0.003 0.017* 0.023*** 0.010 
  
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
 
Ranked by US News 
and World Reports 
0.127*** 0.018 0.051 0.085*** 0.072** 0.025 0.055 0.061 
 
(0.036) (0.043) (0.039) (0.032) (0.029) (0.049) (0.042) (0.041) 
 
Ln Number of Beds 0.069*** 0.038 0.018 0.037** 0.041*** 0.089*** -0.01 0.006 
  
(0.013) (0.033) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) (0.026) (0.016) (0.014) 
 
Teaching Hospital 0.008 0.011 0.001 0.013 0.017 -0.045 0.034 -0.007 
  
(0.016) (0.041) (0.025) (0.018) (0.020) (0.033) (0.032) (0.022) 
 
Government Owned -0.122*** -0.200** -0.117 -0.125** -0.141*** -0.187** -0.193*** 0.091 
  
(0.036) (0.098) (0.072) (0.049) (0.047) (0.075) (0.068) (0.061) 
 
Non-Profit -0.033 0.003 0.042 -0.026 -0.012 -0.083 -0.125*** 0.075 
  
(0.029) (0.047) (0.046) (0.028) (0.027) (0.051) (0.033) (0.055) 
County Characteristics 




-0.099 -0.127 -0.118 -0.227*** -0.070 -0.119 -0.028 -0.055 
 
(0.062) (0.113) (0.137) (0.070) (0.071) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) 
 
Ln Median Income 0.004 -0.053 -0.142 -0.269*** -0.038 -0.125 0.056 -0.056 
  
(0.059) (0.132) (0.140) (0.094) (0.090) (0.140) (0.120) (0.110) 
Other Payers 
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Ln Medicare Base 
Payment Rate 
0.035 0.009 -0.007 -0.063 -0.040 -0.217 -0.073 0.050 
 
(0.089) (0.165) (0.121) (0.097) (0.088) (0.171) (0.143) (0.125) 
 
Ln Share Medicare -0.105*** -0.014 -0.027 -0.065*** -0.052*** -0.006 0.007 0.0001 
  
(0.030) (0.056) (0.028) (0.021) (0.016) (0.052) (0.028) (0.025) 
 
Ln Share Medicaid -0.015 0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.008 0.059*** 0.015 -0.024 
  
(0.025) (0.027) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) 
          
 
HRR FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 8,176 1,250 2,677 3,578 3,837 1,607 3,350 4,854 
 
R-square 0.388 0.622 0.521 0.584 0.59 0.597 0.466 0.385 
                   
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of (8) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. Facilities prices are regression 
adjusted transaction prices. All regressions yearly fixed effects. The omitted ownership category is private hospitals. All specifications are the same as column 
(3) in Table 6.  
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Figure 1: Average Hospital Facilities Charges, Negotiated Prices, and Medicare 
Reimbursements, 2008-2011
 
Notes: The height of the grey bar (top) is the average hospital charge price. The height of the red shaded bar 
(middle) is the negotiated (transaction) price, which is regression adjusted. The blue bar (bottom) captures the 
Medicare reimbursement. All prices are given as a percentage of the negotiated prices. Note that we only include 
hospital-based prices – so we exclude, for example, colonoscopies performed in surgical centers and MRIs that are 
not carried out in hospitals. 
 
 48 
Figure 2: Relationship between Charge and Price for Knee Replacements, 2008-2011
 
Notes: This is a scatter plot of hospital regression-adjusted list prices for knee replacements (“Chargemaster prices”) 
and regression-adjusted transaction prices (“negotiated price”).  There are 937 unique providers included in this 
analysis who deliver 10 or more knee replacements to HCCI funded patients annually.  We include prices from 2008 
through 2011 that are inflation adjusted into 2011 dollars and averaged across the three years.   
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Figure 3: Spending per Medicare and Private Beneficiary 
 
Panel A: HCCI Private Insurer Total Spending Per Beneficiary, 2011 
 
Panel B: Medicare Total Spending Per Beneficiary, 2011 
 
 
Notes: This figure presents average total spending per beneficiary (exclusive of drug spending) per HRR for 2011 
for Medicare beneficiaries and privately insured beneficiaries with coverage from the HCCI insurers. Medicare 
spending data was accessed from http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/. 
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Figure 4: Relationship between 2011 Medicare and Private Overall Spending per 
Beneficiary 
 
Notes: This is a scatter plot of HRRs rankings (1-306) on 2011 overall spending per Medicare beneficiary and 
spending per privately insured beneficiary. Data on Medicare spending was downloaded from the Dartmouth Atlas  
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/. An HRR with a rank of 1 has the lowest spending per beneficiary of all HRRs.  An 
HRR with a rank of 306 has the highest spending per beneficiary of all HRRs.  Overall spending does not include 
drug spending.   
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Figure 5: Raw and Counterfactual Distributions of Inpatient Spending per Beneficiary 
 









Notes: These graphs show the (smoothed kernel) densities of the distribution of spending per beneficiary in 2011 for 
Medicare beneficiaries and the privately insured across HRRs.  The solid blue line presents the true distribution of 
spending.  The thicker red hashed line presents spending per beneficiary where volume is fixed and each HRR 
delivers the same mix of care.  The thinner red hashed line presents spending per beneficiary where the price of each 
HRR is the same across the US.   
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Figure 6: Regional Variation in Inpatient Hospital Price 
 
Panel A: Regression Adjusted HRR-Level Inpatient Hospital Prices, 2008-2011 
 
Panel B: Regression Adjusted HRR-Level Inpatient Hospital Prices Normalized using the 
Wage Index, 2008-2011 
 
Notes: Panel A captures average hospital regression adjusted inpatient prices per HRR, weighted by hospital 
activity, using data from 2008 through 2011 adjusted for inflation into 2011 dollars.  Panel B presents similar HRR 
level average hospital prices, but has normalized prices using the Medicare 2011 wage indexes. This therefore 
captures price after adjusting for the cost of care in each HRR.    
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Figure 7: Within Market Price Variation for Knee Replacement, PTCA, and Colonoscopy in Denver, Atlanta, and Columbus. 
 Denver, CO Atlanta, GA Columbus, OH 
Knee Replacement 
   
PTCA 
   
Lower Limb M
RI 
   
Notes: These present average hospital regression corrected private-payer prices, averaged from 2008 – 2011 using inflation adjusted 2011 prices for knee 
replacement, PTCA, and MRI.  These do not include physician fees.  Each column captures a hospital within an HRR. 
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Figure 8: Bivariate Correlations of the Level of Inpatient Hospital Prices with Observable Factors  
 
Notes: The x-axis captures the correlations between key variables featured in our regression and our hospitals’ regression-adjusted inpatient prices averaged from 
2008 – 2011 and inflation adjusted into 2011 dollars.  The bars capture the 95% confidence intervals surrounding the correlations. For the hospital quality scores, 
the first quintile (Q1) captures hospitals in the worst performing quintile based on that quality measure. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA 
Appendix A1: Datasets and Sources  
Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI) Data: The project draws on data from the Health Care Cost 
Institute (HCCI). The HCCI data includes claims from beneficiaries with employer-sponsored 
coverage from Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealthcare. More details on HCCI can be found at 
www.healthcostinstitute.org. We post a sample hip replacement episode composed of multiple 
claims online at www.healthcarepricingproject.org. This illustrates how we aggregate claims up 
to the episode level and calculate a price.  
The data begins with sheets of membership data, inpatient facilities data, outpatient data, 
physician data, and pharmacy data. We use this to construct our inpatient and procedure samples.  
The data include claims for individuals with fully- and self-insured plans that receive employer-
sponsored insurance. This includes insurance products in the national, large, and small group 
markets. The data include more than forty million covered lives per year and covers 27.6% of 
individuals in the US with employer-sponsored insurance (see Table 1 and Figure A1).   
The most prominent alternative source of insurance claims data is the MarketScan database from 
Truven Health Analytics. MarketScan includes claims for individuals employed at about sixty 
large employers. Unlike HCCI, these data do not include individuals who receive insurance 
coverage in the small group market (i.e. individuals employed at medium and small sized firms) 
and only cover a subset of large firms (Hansen and Chang 2011).
1
 As a consequence, 
MarketScan contains information on fewer people than HCCI in a selected part of the market. 
Chernew et al. (2010) report that the data contain between 16.9 million and 22.9 million covered 
lives per year between 1996 through 2006. In contrast, the HCCI data contain between 42.9 and 
45.1 million lives per year.  
While the MarketScan database is useful for many research applications, it has drawbacks for the 
type of analysis we undertake in this project. First, as mentioned previously, the MarketScan data 
do not cover the small group market. Second, the database has very thin coverage in a number of 
markets. For example, while the smallest HRR in the HCCI data has 4,402 unique individuals, 
MarketScan includes HRRs with fewer than two hundred individuals. Third, the MarketScan 
data do not include geographic information below the three-digit zip code level. In this paper, we 
use five-digit zip code level data to define hospital markets and to merge in local area 
characteristics. Fourth, the MarketScan data do not include a unique hospital identifier or the 
ability to merge in hospital characteristics. As a result, we could not identify a hospital price and 
therefore could not do any of our analyses of variation in hospital prices.  
In addition to the core HCCI data, we merge on a number of other datasets listed below. 
American Hospital Association Annual Survey: We obtain data on hospital characteristics 
from the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey. More information on the AHA 
survey data can be obtained from: http://www.ahadataviewer.com/book-cd-products/AHA-
                                                          
1
 Twenty-five percent of workers with employer sponsored health insurance were employed in firms of size 49 or 
less, thirty-four percent in firms smaller than one hundred, and forty-nine percent in firms of size four hundred 
ninety-nine or less (NIHCM Foundation 2013). 
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Survey/. The survey polls hospitals on characteristics, staffing, technology, finances, and other 
information and has been running since 1946. We use the AHA data to create our technology 
measures and measures of hospital market concentration.  
Medicare Quality Scores: We use data on hospital quality obtained from data.medicare.gov. 
The data includes quality scores drawn from both Medicare and private claims data. The data can 
be downloaded from: https://data.medicare.gov/data/hospital-compare. The quality scores used 
were developed by the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ).  
American Hospital Directory Data: We use data on hospitals’ Medicare activity that we 
obtained from the American Hospital Directory (AHD). The AHD is a for-profit data vendor that 
sells cleaned Medicare data derived from the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review limited 
access database. This includes claims records for 100% of Medicare fee-for-service inpatient 
claims. Details on the AHD data can be found at www.ahd.com. 
U.S. News & World Report Rankings: We obtained rankings of hospitals printed in the US 
News and World Report from 2007 – 2011. Some data were obtained from online rankings. For 
some years, we obtained the physical copy of the printed magazine issues.  
Dartmouth Data: We use data on Medicare spending per HRR that we downloaded from the 
Dartmouth Atlas. Full details on the Dartmouth Atlas Medicare data can be obtained from: 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org 
The Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight Data: We use data from 
The Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) to create alternative 
measures of insurance market concentration. CCIIO is a federal organization within CMS that 
was created under the ACA. It oversees the measurement of Medical Loss Ratios (MLRs). More 
information on the CCIIO data can be obtained from: 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/index.html.  
Census Data: Data on the number of uninsured lives by county, lives privately insured per 
county, and median household income come from the US census. See: 
http://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/ and http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/index.html. 
 
Appendix A2: Identifying Hospitals Using National Plan and Provider Enumeration System 
Identifiers 
Single hospitals can be assigned multiple National Plan and Provider Enumeration System 
Identifiers (NPI) because different wings of the hospitals and different units each have their own 
NPI.  To address this issue, we made a crosswalk that consolidates providers’ multiple NPIs into 
a single, master NPI.  We use the master NPI to merge on data from the AHA and Medicare.  To 
consolidate NPIs, we undertake the following steps: 
1. Compile all variations of AHA ID/hospital name/address/city/state/ZIP Code in the 2000-
2011 AHA survey data, retaining the row for the latest year. 
2. Add NPI from the AHA survey files, beginning with the most recent year.   
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3. Make sure there is only one NPI per AHA ID. If more than one AHA ID have the same
NPI, look up in the CMS NPI Registry to resolve the discrepancy.
4. Check all NPIs in the CMS NPI Registry to make sure they are valid and accurate. Remove
invalid NPIs.
5. Look up hospitals in the NPI Registry that do not have a NPI in AHA by name and address.
Attach NPI to the AHA file when a match is found.
6. Extract all organizational rows from the CMS NPI Registry where primary taxonomy code
is for a hospital (287300000X, 281P00000X, 281PC2000X, 282N00000X, 282NC2000X,
282NC0060X, 282NR1301X, 282NW0100X, 282E00000X, 286500000X, 2865C1500X,
2865M2000X, 2865X1600X, 283Q00000X, 283X00000X, 283X00000X, 283XC2000X,
282J00000X, 284300000X) or hospital unit (273100000X, 275N00000X, 273R00000X,
273Y00000X, 276400000X).
7. Match AHA compiled address file to the hospital NPI file on NPI. Add AHA number to the
hospital NPI file and mark the NPI as ‘PRIMARY’ NPI for that hospital.
8. Match remaining rows in the hospital NPI file according to the following hierarchy:
1. Organization name, address1, city, state, ZIP Code
2. Address1, city, state, ZIP Code, similar organization name
3. Other organization name, address1, city, state, ZIP Code
4. Address1, city, state, ZIP Code, similar other organization name
5. Address, city, state, ZIP Code, different name (validated name changes via web
search)
2
6. Organization name, similar address1, city, state, ZIP Code
3
7. Other organization name, similar address1, city, state, ZIP Code
8. Similar organization name, similar address1, city, state, ZIP Code
9. Similar other organization name, similar address1, state, ZIP Code
10. Medicare number, city, state, ZIP Code
9. When a match is found, append AHA ID and ‘PRIMARY’ NPI.
10. Some hospitals in the NPI Registry were not in the AHA survey data files.  For these
hospitals, we pick one NPI as ‘PRIMARY’ and, using the match steps outlined above,
add an ‘X’ to the AHA ID column and append the ‘PRIMARY’ NPI to all matched rows.
11. We also consolidated NPIs to ZIP codes.  To do so, we:
1. Sort file by ZIP Code, primary taxonomy code, address1
2. Where more than one ‘PRIMARY’ NPI exists within a ZIP Code for the same
organization name and primary taxonomy, change all rows to the ‘PRIMARY’
NPI associated with the AHA ID.
3. Where more than one ‘PRIMARY’ NPI exists within a ZIP Code for the same
organization name and primary taxonomy but none of the rows is associated with
an AHA ID, double check against the AHA file. If no match is found, consolidate
the rows to one single ‘PRIMARY’ NPI.
2 Because there can be hospitals within hospitals (e.g., specialty or children’s hospital on one floor of a general 
hospital), all of these occurrences were manually validated to ensure that the correct hospital was identified. 
3 
Suburb names are occasionally used in addresses (e.g., Brentwood vs. Los Angeles). If the address1, state, and ZIP 
Code matched but the city name differed, this was still considered a valid match at each level. 
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Appendix A3: Defining the samples 
The inpatient sample in our data includes all inpatient claims aggregated to the DRG-level. The 
clinical procedures we use are defined using combinations of ICD9 codes and DRGs. In the case 
of MRIs, we identify episodes using the CPT-4 code. These are detailed in Table A1. 
 
Appendix B: Details of Formal Price/Quantity Decomposition.  
We performed formal decompositions of the variance of log spending separately for 
Medicare and privately insured beneficiaries. To do so, we decompose the variance of the natural 
log of spending per DRG d into 3 components, 
  var(ln(pdqd)) =  var(ln(pd)) + var(ln(qd) + 2cov(ln(pd) , ln(qd)), 
Here, pd is a vector of the HRR-level average prices of DRG d and qd is the DRG-specific 
vector of inpatient visits divided by beneficiaries in each HRR.  
The component      
var(ln(pd))
var(ln(pdqd))
  represents the share of the variance in spending attributable to 
differences in price across HRRs. The term    
var(ln(qd))
var(ln(pdqd))
, represents the share of the variance 




represents the share of the variance attributable to the covariance of price and quantity across 
HRRs.  
Table A5 presents the results of this decomposition for each of the 25 highest spending DRGs 
across Medicare and private payers. On average, variation in the quantity of DRGs provided in 
each HRR accounts for 76.65% of the variance in Medicare spending; 9.37% of the variance is 
attributable to variation in price of care. In contrast, for the privately insured, price variation is 
responsible for 45.89% of the variance in spending across HRRs, while quantity only accounts 






Table A1: Comparison of AHA Hospitals, the Inpatient Sub-sample and the Procedure Sub-samples 
                      











Delivery PTCA Colonoscopy MRI 
Market Characteristics 
         
 
Monopoly 0.241 0.140 0.025 0.062 0.072 0.095 0.037 0.148 0.180 
 
Duopoly 0.140 0.143 0.063 0.120 0.111 0.127 0.087 0.145 0.159 
 
Triopoly 0.091 0.100 0.075 0.088 0.098 0.100 0.080 0.087 0.097 
 
Hospital HHI 0.509 0.433 0.306 0.365 0.366 0.395 0.322 0.429 0.473 
 
Insurer HHI 0.217 0.212 0.210 0.209 0.210 0.207 0.202 0.215 0.219 
 
HCCI Market Share, County 0.149 0.180 0.243 0.227 0.203 0.195 0.226 0.199 0.187 
Hospital Characteristics 
         
 
Technologies 48 59 69 65 68 66 71 64 61 
 
Ranked in US News & World 
Reports 0.028 0.047 0.107 0.063 0.053 0.055 0.090 0.061 0.049 
 
Number of Beds 204 266 376 315 334 320 402 279 256 
 
Teaching Hospital 0.314 0.377 0.545 0.454 0.459 0.443 0.527 0.400 0.368 
 
Government Owned 0.196 0.105 0.059 0.070 0.085 0.096 0.079 0.105 0.116 
 
Non-Profit 0.566 0.668 0.763 0.717 0.742 0.734 0.732 0.725 0.692 
Local Area Characteristics 
         
 
Percent of County Uninsured 0.177 0.174 0.169 0.172 0.171 0.172 0.176 0.167 0.170 
 
Median Income $48,772 $51,404 $54,428 $53,019 $53,907 $53,493 $52,436 $52,710 $50,924 
 
Rural 0.277 0.152 0.021 0.063 0.066 0.086 0.038 0.137 0.194 
Other Payers 
         
 
Medicare Payment Rate $6,327 $6,464 $6,298 $6,207 $6,484 $6,522 $6,394 $6,411 $6,223 
 
Share of Medicare 0.447 0.451 0.441 0.447 0.426 0.430 0.449 0.452 0.458 
 
Share of Medicaid 0.173 0.186 0.146 0.161 0.188 0.192 0.169 0.178 0.177 
Quality Scores 
         
 
30-day AMI death rate 0.158 0.157 0.153 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.154 0.158 0.158 
 
% of AMI patients given 
aspirin at arrival 0.872 0.938 0.908 0.915 0.970 0.969 0.983 0.957 0.932 
 
% of patients given antibiotics 
1 hour before surgery 0.888 0.958 0.955 0.961 0.961 0.962 0.955 0.954 0.952 
 
% of surgery patients given 
treatment to prevent blood clots 
within 24 hours 0.843 0.913 0.910 0.918 0.914 0.914 0.904 0.905 0.906 
Number of Hospitals 3,830 2,252 477 937 1,113 1,214 598 1,193 1,583 
                      
Notes: The inpatient data is derived from the inpatient sample. The procedure files are drawn from the procedure samples. 
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Table A2: Definitions for the Seven Procedure Samples 
 
          
      
Procedure ICD9 and  
MS-
DRG or CPT-4 
Hip Replacement 8151 
 
470 
  Knee Replacement 8154 
 
470 
  Cesarean Section 741 
 
766 
  Vaginal Delivery 7359 
 
775 
  PTCA 0066 
 
247 
  Colonoscopy V7651 (CM) 
    MRI 
    
73721 
            
 
Notes: For hip and knee replacements, we limit our analysis to individuals between forty-five and sixty-four years 
of age. For vaginal deliveries and cesarean sections, we limit our analysis to delivering mothers who are between the 
ages of twenty-five and thirty-four.  In order to be included, an MRI episode must be a single-line facility claim and 
we must observe a separate physician payment for the reading of the MRI. We do this to ensure that we are isolating 
the professional component (reading of the MRI) from the technical component (administering the scan). We also 
limit MRIs to those carried out on individuals who had no other hospital claims on the day that the MRI was 
provided and for whom the hospitalization was exclusively for the MRI. Similarly, for colonoscopies, we limit our 
analysis to individuals age forty-five through sixty-four and only include hospital-based episodes where nothing else 
was done to the patient that day and for which the colonoscopy was the reason for the trip to the hospital. We 
exclude colonoscopies where a biopsy was taken.  
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Table A3: Pricing Regressions: Coefficients from Equation (1) for Inpatient Prices and equation (3) for Procedures Prices 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 










Delivery PTCA Colonoscopy MRI 
Age 25-34 -67.4***     -1,285.1  -2.4 
 
(25.4)     (3,649.8)  (3.0) 
Age 36-44 -33.6     -1,446.2  -3.5 
 
(26.6)     (3,609.7)  (2.8) 




  (3,607.2) 
 
(2.7) 
Age 55-64 -139.1*** -473.3*** -211.8***   -2,197.6 1.5 -3.3 
 
(28.8) (83.1) (56.3) 
  
(3,606.7) (2.3) (2.7) 
Charlson Score 1 -103.8*** -81.0 -22.3 52.1** 48.8*** -585.0*** 30.0*** 1.1 
 
(21.9) (125.9) (72.9) (26.1) (17.5) (147.8) (4.6) (2.5) 
Charlson Score 2 181.0*** 256.6 -179.5* 51.3 133.3*** -837.0*** 26.6*** -0.2 
 
(25.1) (158.1) (99.3) (59.7) (41.3) (168.5) (4.8) (3.7) 
Charlson Score 3 238.6*** -1,051.3*** -376.3* 277.6 119.5 -413.6 39.6*** 3.2 
 
(42.7) (339.4) (199.8) (227.0) (176.2) (289.8) (13.2) (8.8) 
Charlson Score 4 280.0*** -673.6 -262.2 -158.5 -223.4 -1,934.0*** 29.1* -1.3 
 
(52.7) (510.0) (327.8) (164.6) (154.6) (431.5) (15.4) (12.0) 
Charlson Score 5 702.8*** -2,223.4** -397.6 -131.7 1,110.3* -1,134.0 37.6 -24.6 
 
(90.2) (1,058.0) (675.5) (747.9) (634.5) (848.1) (37.9) (26.9) 
Charlson Score 6 1,135.0*** -287.9 -132.4 -452.9 226.4 -959.8 82.8*** -5.5 
 
(46.0) (517.1) (491.2) (347.0) (240.8) (746.4) (18.3) (14.9) 
Female -162.6*** 154.0* -13.7 
  
-348.7*** 4.2* -2.0 
 
(15.9) (79.8) (51.4) 
  
(110.6) (2.3) (1.4) 
DRG Fixed Effects  Yes No No No No No No No 
Observations 3,544,320 28,628 75,734 159,034 202,488 36,765 132,104 206,429 
R-Square 0.541 0.565 0.537 0.617 0.570 0.453 0.678 0.703 
                  
 
Notes: The omitted category for the Charlson Index is 0. The omitted age category is 18-24. All regressions include hospital x year fixed effects and column (1) 
also includes DRG fixed effects. Estimates of DRG and hospital x year fixed effects are not reported to save space.  
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Table A4: Ranking of Spending Per Medicare and Privately Insured Beneficiaries 
               
Panel A: Expensive Private, Cheap Medicare 
  








La Crosse WI  $4,272 285 
 
$6,844 1 
Rochester MN  $4,564 296 
 
$7,433 14 
Minot ND  $4,215 280 
 
$7,078 4 
Albany GA  $4,798 302 
 
$7,887 37 
Marshfield WI  $4,678 300 
 
$7,852 35 
Idaho Falls ID  $4,499 293 
 
$7,769 32 
Sioux Falls SD  $4,497 292 
 
$7,743 31 
Wausau WI  $4,518 295 
 
$7,789 34 
Grand Junction CO  $4,082 264 
 
$7,075 3 








                
 (Rank of 1 is lowest spending) 
                   
Panel B: Cheap Private, Expensive Medicare 
  








San Bernardino CA  $2,548 6 
 
$11,189 276 
Detroit MI  $3,029 53 
 
$11,656 293 
Pontiac MI  $3,053 55 
 
$11,618 292 
Baltimore MD  $2,996 48 
 
$11,365 284 
Corpus Christi TX  $2,994 46 
 
$11,290 281 
Royal Oak MI  $3,103 66 
 
$11,392 286 
New Orleans LA  $2,966 41 
 
$10,371 248 
Hattiesburg MS  $2,755 20 
 
$9,962 215 
Johnstown PA  $3,065 60 
 
$10,567 255 








                
 (Rank of 1 is lowest spending) 




               
Panel C: Expensive Private, Expensive Medicare 
  








Manhattan NY  $4,152 272 
 
$13,576 304 
Paterson NJ  $4,152 271 
 
$11,685 295 









White Plains NY  $4,210 279 
 
$11,085 273 
Alameda County CA  $4,126 269 
 
$11,194 277 
Bronx NY  $3,878 239 
 
$13,678 305 
Ridgewood NJ  $4,105 265 
 
$11,217 278 
Napa CA  $5,516 306 
 
$10,117 233 








                
 (Rank of 1 is lowest spending) 
                   
Panel D: Cheap Private, Cheap Medicare 
  








Honolulu HI  $1,707 1 
 
$7,245 6 
Rochester NY  $2,196 3 
 
$7,285 8 
Dubuque IA  $2,573 9 
 
$7,243 5 
Bismark ND  $2,144 2 
 
$7,443 15 
Lynchburg VA  $2,618 10 
 
$7,713 28 
Great Falls MT  $2,738 19 
 
$7,714 29 
Medford OR  $2,955 39 
 
$7,326 11 
Binghamton NY  $2,918 34 
 
$7,539 19 
Des Moines IA  $2,903 31 
 
$7,654 26 








                
 (Rank of 1 is lowest spending) 
     
Notes: These are the four quadrants with the top and bottom 10 HRRs in terms of spending on Medicare and private 
payers per beneficiary. 
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Table A5: Results of Formal Price/Quantity Decomposition for Top-25 Highest Spending DRGs and the Average Across all 
DRGs 
                
        
 














        Cardiac valve & oth maj cardiothoracic proc w/o card cath w CC 0.512 0.178 0.310 
 
0.117 0.481 0.403 
Cardiac valve & oth maj cardiothoracic proc w/o card cath w MCC 0.504 0.134 0.362 
 
0.113 0.468 0.418 
Cellulitis w/o MCC 0.392 0.974 -0.366 
 
0.073 0.968 -0.041 
Circulatory disorders except AMI, w card cath w/o MCC 0.436 0.602 -0.038 
 
0.066 1.011 -0.077 
Coronary bypass w cardiac cath w/o MCC 0.561 0.142 0.298 
 
0.061 0.722 0.217 
Craniotomy & endovascular intracranial procedures w MCC 0.408 0.190 0.402 
 
0.078 0.545 0.378 
Esophagitis, gastroent & misc digest disorders w/o MCC 0.577 0.803 -0.380 
 
0.107 1.043 -0.150 
Infectious & parasitic diseases w O.R. procedure w MCC 0.672 0.050 0.278 
 
0.090 0.624 0.286 
Kidney & urinary tract infections w/o MCC 0.538 0.872 -0.410 
 
0.099 1.072 -0.170 
Major cardiovasc procedures w MCC or thoracic aortic anuerysm repair 0.597 0.096 0.307 
 
0.117 0.521 0.363 
Major cardiovascular procedures w/o MCC 0.521 0.265 0.213 
 
0.109 0.696 0.195 
Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity w/o MCC 0.554 0.736 -0.289 
 
0.123 1.017 -0.140 
Major small & large bowel procedures w CC 0.417 0.562 0.020 
 
0.116 0.890 -0.006 
Major small & large bowel procedures w MCC 0.717 0.188 0.094 
 
0.143 0.705 0.152 
Nutritional & misc metabolic disorders w/o MCC 0.520 0.739 -0.259 
 
0.110 1.073 -0.183 
Perc cardiovasc proc w drug-eluting stent w MCC or 4+ vessels/stents 0.557 0.228 0.215 
 
0.082 0.674 0.244 
Perc cardiovasc proc w drug-eluting stent w/o MCC 0.658 0.760 -0.417 
 
0.101 1.108 -0.210 
Pulmonary edema & respiratory failure 0.542 0.340 0.118 
 
0.142 0.736 0.122 
Rehabilitation w CC/MCC 0.318 0.714 -0.032 
 
0.045 0.838 0.117 
Respiratory system diagnosis w ventilator support 96+ hours 0.518 0.147 0.335 
 
0.114 0.531 0.355 
Septicemia w MV 96+ hours 0.635 0.067 0.298 
 
0.099 0.533 0.368 
Septicemia w/o MV 96+ hours w MCC 0.795 0.565 -0.360 
 
0.076 0.865 0.060 
Simple pneumonia & pleurisy w CC 0.845 0.857 -0.702 
 
0.126 1.044 -0.170 
Simple pneumonia & pleurisy w MCC 0.805 0.583 -0.388 
 
0.089 1.087 -0.176 
Spinal fusion except cervical w/o MCC 0.344 0.388 0.269 
 
0.079 0.738 0.183 
Average Shares (weighted by spending) 0.459 0.362 0.179 
 
0.094 0.766 0.140 
                
Notes: The decomposition of Ln(spending per beneficiary) is carried out on 2011 Medicare and HCCI data.  Details are in the text of Appendix B. CC is short 
for with complication or comorbidity. MCC is short for with major complication or comorbidity. We include the top 25 highest spending DRGs in the table and 
the average shares weighted by DRG spending. Full results are available at www.healthcarepricingproject.org.
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Table A6: List of Technologies Included in the Hospital Technology Index 
      
   
 
Available Mean 
Adult cardiology services 2009-2011 0.8131 
Adult diagnostic catheterization 2008-2011 0.7986 
Acute long term care 2008-2011 0.0362 
Adult cardiac surgery 2008-2011 0.5407 
Adult cardiac electrophysiology-hospital 2008-2011 0.5503 
Adult day care program 2008-2011 0.0555 
HIV-AIDS services 2008-2011 0.4122 
Airborne infection isolation room 2008-2011 0.8960 
Alcohol/drug abuse or dependency inpatient care 2008-2011 0.1352 
Alcohol/drug abuse or dependency outpatient services 2008-2011 0.2345 
Alzheimer Center 2008-2011 0.0688 
Ambulance services 2008-2011 0.1582 
Ambulatory surgery center 2008-2011 0.3797 
Arthritis treatment center 2008-2011 0.1084 
Assisted living services 2008-2011 0.0276 
Auxiliary 2008-2011 0.7461 
Shaped beam Radiation System 2008-2011 0.3791 
Blood Donor Center Hospital 2008-2011 0.1348 
Burn care 2008-2011 0.0715 
Birthing room/LDR room/LDRP room 2008-2011 0.8461 
Bariatric/weight control services 2008-2011 0.4651 
Computer assisted orthopedic surgery 2008-2011 0.2861 
Cardiac Rehabilitation 2008-2011 0.7284 
Chaplaincy/pastoral care services 2008-2011 0.8925 
Chiropractic services 2008-2011 0.0298 
Chemotherapy 2008-2011 0.8067 
Cardiac intensive care 2008-2011 0.5477 
Case Management 2008-2011 0.9821 
Complementary and alternative medicine services 2008-2011 0.3165 
Community outreach 2008-2011 0.8573 
Crisis prevention 2008-2011 0.3486 
Computed-tomography (CT) scanner 2008-2011 0.9787 
Children's wellness program 2008-2011 0.2938 
Dental services 2008-2011 0.3226 
Diagnostic radioisotope facility 2008-2011 0.8736 
Electron Beam Computed Tomography (EBCT) 2008-2011 0.1305 
Emergency Department 2008-2011 0.9830 
Enabling Services 2008-2011 0.3939 
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Ablation of Barrett's esophagus 2008-2011 0.3593 
Optical Colonoscopy-hospital 2008-2011 0.6880 
Esophageal impedance study 2008-2011 0.3370 
Endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography (ERCP) 2008-2011 0.7600 
Endoscopic ultrasound 2008-2011 0.5137 
Enrollment Assistance Program 2008-2011 0.6766 
Extracorporeal shock waved lithotripter (ESWL) 2008-2011 0.4741 
Full-field digital mammography 2008-2011 0.6481 
Fitness center 2008-2011 0.3765 
Fertility Clinic 2008-2011 0.1152 
Freestanding/Satellite Emergency Department 2008-2011 0.0964 
General medical and surgical care (adult) 2008-2011 0.9965 
Geriatric services 2008-2011 0.5103 
Genetic testing/counseling 2008-2011 0.2553 
Heart transplant 2008-2011 0.0566 
Hemodialysis 2008-2011 0.5481 
Community Health Education 2008-2011 0.8699 
Health Fair 2008-2011 0.8779 
Health screenings 2008-2011 0.9012 
Health research 2008-2011 0.4102 
Home health services 2008-2011 0.3046 
Hospice Program 2008-2011 0.2854 
Indigent care clinic 2008-2011 0.2586 
Intermediate nursing care 2008-2011 0.0667 
Adult interventional cardiac catheterization 2008-2011 0.6885 
Image-guided radiation therapy 2008-2011 0.3674 
Immunization program 2008-2011 0.4433 
Intraoperative magnetic resonance imaging 2008-2011 0.0794 
Intensity-Modulated Radiation Therapy (IMRT) 2008-2011 0.4636 
Inpatient palliative care unit 2008-2011 0.1450 
Kidney transplant 2008-2011 0.1005 
Linguistic/translation services 2008-2011 0.7242 
Liver transplant 2008-2011 0.0559 
Lung transplant 2008-2011 0.0343 
Breast cancer screening/mammograms 2008-2011 0.9114 
Meals on wheels 2008-2011 0.1079 
Mobile Health Services 2008-2011 0.1757 
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 2008-2011 0.9156 
Multi-slice spiral computed tomography 64 + slice 2008-2011 0.6594 
Multislice spiral computed tomography < 64 slice 2008-2011 0.8266 
Medical/surgical intensive care 2008-2011 0.9461 
Neurological services 2008-2011 0.8273 
Neonatal intensive care 2008-2011 0.4338 
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Neonatal intermediate care 2008-2011 0.3187 
Nutrition program 2008-2011 0.9054 
Obstetrics care 2008-2011 0.8561 
Occupational health services 2008-2011 0.7972 
Oncology services 2008-2011 0.8498 
Freestanding outpatient center 2008-2011 0.4832 
Hospital-base outpatient care center/services 2008-2011 0.8710 
Outpatient surgery 2008-2011 0.9964 
Orthopedic services 2008-2011 0.9544 
Bone Marrow transplant services 2008-2011 0.0810 
Other care 2008-2011 0.1349 
Other intensive care 2008-2011 0.1922 
Other long-term care 2008-2011 0.0417 
Other Transplant 2008-2011 0.0994 
Pain Management Program 2008-2011 0.7305 
Palliative Care Program 2008-2011 0.5142 
Patient education center 2008-2011 0.7631 
Patient representative services 2008-2011 0.8586 
Patient Controlled Analgesia 2008-2011 0.8953 
Pediatric cardiology services 2009-2011 0.1447 
Primary care department 2008-2011 0.4578 
Pediatric diagnostic catheterization 2008-2011 0.0832 
Pediatric cardiac surgery 2008-2011 0.0724 
Pediatric cardiac electrophysiology-hospital 2008-2011 0.0723 
General medical and surgical care (pediatric) 2008-2011 0.6272 
Pediatric intensive care 2008-2011 0.1702 
Pediatric interventional cardiac catheterization 2008-2011 0.0765 
Pediatric emergency department 2011 0.2017 
Positron emission tomography/CT (PET/CT) 2008-2011 0.3571 
Positron emission tomography (PET) 2008-2011 0.2952 
Psychiatric residential treatment 2011 0.0586 
Psychiatric child/adolescent services 2008-2011 0.2359 
Psychiatric education services 2008-2011 0.3485 
Psychiatric emergency services 2008-2011 0.5125 
Psychiatric geriatric services 2008-2011 0.4129 
Psychiatric care 2008-2011 0.4694 
Psychiatric consultation/liaison services 2008-2011 0.4824 
Psychiatric outpatient services 2008-2011 0.3587 
Psychiatric partial hospitalization program 2008-2011 0.2555 
Proton beam therapy 2008-2011 0.0401 
Assistive technology center 2009-2011 0.1923 
Robot-assisted walking therapy 2008-2011 0.0321 
Electrodiagnostic services 2009-2011 0.3594 
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Physical Rehabilitation care 2008-2011 0.4245 
Retirement housing 2008-2011 0.0229 
Physical rehabilitation outpatient services 2008-2011 0.8624 
Robotic surgery 2008-2011 0.3801 
Prosthetic and orthotic services 2009-2011 0.2273 
Simulated rehabilitation environment 2008-2011 0.3268 
Rural health clinic 2010-2011 0.0749 
Sleep Center 2008-2011 0.6584 
Skilled nursing care 2008-2011 0.2099 
Social work services 2008-2011 0.9457 
Other special care 2008-2011 0.2647 
Single photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT) 2008-2011 0.6592 
Sports medicine 2008-2011 0.5397 
Stereotactic radiosurgery 2008-2011 0.3495 
Support groups 2008-2011 0.8339 
Swing bed services 2008-2011 0.0717 
Teen outreach services 2008-2011 0.2227 
Tissue transplant 2008-2011 0.1254 
Tobacco Treatment Services 2008-2011 0.6652 
Transportation to health services 2008-2011 0.2940 
Certified trauma center 2008-2011 0.4486 
Ultrasound 2008-2011 0.9798 
Urgent care center 2008-2011 0.3194 
Volunteer services department 2008-2011 0.9476 
Virtual colonoscopy 2008-2011 0.2663 
Wound Management Services 2008-2011 0.7986 
Women’s health center/services 2008-2011 0.7744 
      
Notes: This data is from the AHA Annual Survey. It covers 2,252 providers. The mean is the simple average of a 
binary indicator of whether or not the particular technology is used in the hospital.
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Table A7: Estimates of Equation (8) with Price in Levels (Instead of Logarithms) 
              
  
(1) (2) (3)   (4) 
 
Dependent 




     
 












































     
 








Ranked by US News 
and World Reports 




























































     
 
Ln Medicare Base 
Payment Rate 
































R-square 0.121 0.377 0.386 
 
0.606 
              
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation (8) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-
level in parentheses. Facilities prices are regression corrected transaction prices and are unlogged. Facilities charges 
are regression corrected list prices. All regressions include yearly fixed effects. The omitted ownership category is 
private hospitals.  
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Table A8: Main Inpatient Regression Estimates of (8) Using Different Measures of Hospital Market Concentration 
                  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Ln(Facilities Price) 
Hospital Market Structure 
       
 
Ln HHI 0.169*** 0.338*** 0.409*** 0.248*** 
   
  
(0.065) (0.057) (0.096) (0.061) 
   
 
Hospital Count 
    
-0.065*** 
  





     
0.151*** 0.094*** 




     
0.085*** 
 





     
0.027 
 




Radius 5 mile 15 mile 30 mile Variable 15 mile 15 mile 15 mile 
Insurer Market Structure 
       
 
Ln Insurer HHI -0.256 -0.210 -0.219 -0.204 -0.203 -0.232 -0.250 
  
(0.332) (0.307) (0.316) (0.327) (0.333) (0.312) (0.318) 
 
Ln Share HCCI -0.163*** -0.130*** -0.132*** -0.149*** -0.134*** -0.139*** -0.150*** 
  
(0.037) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) 
Hospital Characteristics 
       
 
Ln Technologies 0.009** 0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 0.009* 0.009** 0.009** 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
Ranked by US News & World 
Reports 
0.134*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 
 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) 
 
HRR FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 8,176 8,176 8,176 8,176 8,176 8,176 8,176 
 
R-square 0.383 0.391 0.386 0.387 0.387 0.389 0.386 
                  
 Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation (8) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. We use multiple 
measures of hospital market concentration. Column (1) includes hospital HHIs where the market is defined using a five-mile fixed radius drawn around each 
hospital. Column (2) includes hospital HHIs where the market is defined using a fifteen-mile fixed radius drawn around each hospital. Column (3) includes 
hospital HHIs where the market is defined using a thirty-mile fixed radius drawn around each hospital. In Column (4), we measure hospital HHIs in variable radii 
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markets.  Hospitals located in ‘large urban’ areas are assigned a market defined by a 10-mile radius; hospitals located in ‘urban’ have a market defined around 
them using a 15-mile radius; and hospitals located in ‘rural’ areas have a market defined around them using a 20-mile radius. In Column (5), we measure market 
concentration using counts of hospitals within a fifteen-mile radius drawn around each hospital. In Column (6), we use dummy variables to capture the quartiles 
of our hospital HHIs measured within hospital markets defined using fixed radii extending fifteen-miles around each hospital. The omitted category, quartile 1, is 
the least concentrated quartile. In Column (7), we measure the effect of being in the most concentrated quartile of hospital HHI within a market defined by a 
fifteen-mile fixed radius market drawn around each hospital. The reference categories are the other three quartiles of hospital HHI. Facilities prices are 
regression-adjusted transaction prices. All regressions include yearly fixed effects and controls for number of beds, teaching status, government ownership, non-
profit status, county insurance rate and median income, Medicare payment rate, and share of hospital activity covered by Medicare and Medicaid. The omitted 
ownership category is private hospitals. 
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Table A9: Main Estimates of (8) Across Hospitals with High and Low HCCI Coverage, 
States with High and Low Blue Cross Blue Shield Insurance Coverage, and Hospitals in 
Urban and Rural Areas 
                
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Facilities Price) 
Sample High HCCI Low HCCI High BCBS Low BCBS Urban Rural 
Market Characteristics 
      
 
Monopoly 0.150*** 0.209*** 0.089*** 0.183*** 0.131*** 0.060 
  
(0.041) (0.047) (0.032) (0.046) (0.038) (0.074) 
 
Duopoly 0.064** 0.150*** 0.028 0.090** 0.045 0.090 
  
(0.031) (0.052) (0.031) (0.038) (0.031) (0.073) 
 
Triopoly 0.074** 0.024 -0.015 0.082* 0.029 0.233*** 
  
(0.036) (0.047) (0.034) (0.044) (0.031) (0.077) 
 
Ln Insurer HHI 0.204 -0.746 -0.050 0.139 -0.411 0.942* 
  
(0.352) (0.548) (0.538) (0.605) (0.325) (0.556) 
 
Ln Share HCCI 
  
-0.097*** -0.171*** -0.132*** -0.140*** 
    
(0.037) (0.053) (0.047) (0.043) 
Hospital Characteristics 
      
 
Ln Technologies 0.010* 0.008 0.013** 0.004 0.008 0.030*** 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) 
 
Ranked by US News 
and World Reports 
0.078** 0.190*** 0.107* 0.123*** 0.126*** 0.260** 
 
(0.039) (0.056) (0.059) (0.047) (0.038) (0.125) 
 
Ln Number of Beds 0.056*** 0.109*** 0.082*** 0.068*** 0.077*** 0.050 
  
(0.014) (0.029) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.045) 
 
Teaching Hospital 0.0001 0.024 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.032 
  
(0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.019) (0.016) (0.071) 
 
Government Owned -0.135*** -0.093** -0.102*** -0.133** -0.100*** -0.268*** 
  
(0.049) (0.042) (0.036) (0.056) (0.036) (0.099) 
 
Non-Profit -0.014 -0.062 -0.050 -0.013 -0.014 -0.188*** 
  
(0.035) (0.043) (0.037) (0.038) (0.029) (0.057) 
County Characteristics 
      
 
Ln Percent Uninsured -0.110 -0.159* -0.078 -0.097 -0.186*** 0.169 
  
(0.078) (0.090) (0.074) (0.085) (0.067) (0.156) 
 
Ln Median Income -0.185*** 0.023 0.019 0.005 -0.060 0.265** 
  
(0.068) (0.082) (0.076) (0.086) (0.065) (0.125) 
Other Payers 
      
 
Ln Medicare Base 
Payment Rate 
0.008 -0.010 0.106 -0.023 -0.019 0.180 
 
(0.103) (0.146) (0.153) (0.110) (0.097) (0.339) 
 
Ln Share Medicare -0.126*** -0.044** -0.02 -0.131*** -0.081*** -0.128* 
  
(0.036) (0.020) (0.032) (0.033) (0.025) (0.066) 
 
Ln Share Medicaid -0.007 0.000 0.029 -0.035 0.009 -0.106*** 
  
(0.028) (0.025) (0.031) (0.029) (0.022) (0.030) 
 
HRR FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 5,565 2,611 3,789 4,387 7,136 1,040 
 
R-square 0.297 0.523 0.504 0.312 0.409 0.607 
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Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation (8) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-
level in parentheses. Facilities prices are regression corrected transaction prices. Facilities charges are regression 
corrected list prices. All regressions include yearly fixed effects. The omitted ownership category is private 
hospitals. In column (1), the High HCCI sample includes data from states where the HCCI data contributors cover 
over 20% of individuals in the state with employer sponsored coverage. In column (2), the Low HCCI sample 
includes data from states where the HCCI data contributors cover less than 20% of individuals in the state with 
employer sponsored coverage. In column (3), the High BCBS sample includes data from states where over 20% of 
the population has employer-sponsored coverage from Blue Cross Blue Shield insurers. In column (4), the Low 
BCBS sample includes data from states where less than 20% of the population has employer-sponsored coverage 
from Blue Cross Blue Shield insurers. In column (5), we limit our analysis to data from hospitals in non-rural areas. 
In column (6), we limit our analysis to data from hospitals in rural areas. These were defined using US census 
definitions, see: https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/uafaq.html. 
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Table A10: Estimates of Procedure-Level Regressions (2008 – 2011) without HRR Fixed Effects 
                    
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
















        
 
Monopoly 0.202*** 0.098 0.195*** 0.172*** 0.134*** 0.103 0.041 0.177*** 
  
(0.026) (0.082) (0.048) (0.050) (0.036) (0.090) (0.045) (0.038) 
 
Duopoly 0.134*** 0.037 0.065 0.078* 0.069** 0.155** 0.072* 0.127*** 
  
(0.024) (0.051) (0.042) (0.041) (0.029) (0.072) (0.039) (0.034) 
 
Triopoly 0.092*** 0.115** 0.071 0.072* 0.011 0.054 0.002 0.109*** 
  
(0.028) (0.052) (0.050) (0.040) (0.032) (0.060) (0.049) (0.038) 
 
Ln Insurer HHI -0.087 -0.034 -0.047 0.067 -0.080 0.087 -0.155 -0.073 
  
(0.182) (0.241) (0.218) (0.181) (0.158) (0.329) (0.257) (0.299) 
 
Ln Share HCCI -0.121*** -0.002 -0.018 -0.085** -0.065** -0.043 -0.051 -0.089** 
  
(0.026) (0.045) (0.041) (0.035) (0.030) (0.050) (0.052) (0.034) 
Hospital Characteristics 
        
 
Ln Technologies 0.008 -0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.004 0.025** 0.010 0.019** 
  
(0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) 
 
Ranked by US News 
and World Reports 
0.134*** 0.022 0.047 0.070* 0.048 -0.001 -0.016 0.031 
 
(0.035) (0.046) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.048) (0.039) (0.044) 
 
Ln Number of Beds 0.046*** 0.023 0.021 0.030* 0.036** 0.090*** 0.002 -0.015 
  
(0.013) (0.030) (0.021) (0.015) (0.014) (0.033) (0.018) (0.016) 
 
Teaching Hospital 0.004 -0.043 -0.044 -0.007 -0.009 -0.097*** -0.024 0.019 
  
(0.018) (0.038) (0.028) (0.022) (0.021) (0.033) (0.029) (0.022) 
 
Government Owned -0.111*** -0.007 -0.072 -0.086* -0.083* -0.224*** -0.081 0.121** 
  
(0.035) (0.101) (0.070) (0.047) (0.043) (0.070) (0.059) (0.058) 
 
Non-Profit -0.013 0.082 0.043 0.038 0.059** -0.123*** -0.018 0.093* 
  
(0.026) (0.059) (0.039) (0.032) (0.029) (0.042) (0.040) (0.048) 
County Characteristics 
        
 
Ln Percent Uninsured 0.156*** 0.179** 0.181** -0.029 -0.005 0.061 0.032 0.013 
  
(0.053) (0.081) (0.080) (0.063) (0.049) (0.090) (0.098) (0.059) 
 
Ln Median Income 0.304*** 0.166* 0.167* 0.225*** 0.281*** 0.122 0.134 0.116 
  
(0.060) (0.091) (0.092) (0.075) (0.061) (0.124) (0.107) (0.085) 
Other Payers 
        
 
Ln Medicare Base 
Payment Rate 
0.208** 0.551*** 0.408*** 0.440*** 0.558*** 0.215* 0.313** 0.025 
 
(0.080) (0.153) (0.127) (0.111) (0.095) (0.127) (0.136) (0.126) 
 
Ln Share Medicare -0.106*** -0.071 -0.083* -0.048** -0.020 0.002 0.077* -0.007 
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(0.028) (0.088) (0.044) (0.021) (0.018) (0.050) (0.041) (0.029) 
 
Ln Share Medicaid -0.026 -0.075** -0.038** -0.038** -0.053*** -0.016 -0.018 -0.023 
  
(0.022) (0.031) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) 
          
 
HRR FE  No No No No No No No No 
 
Observations 8,176 1,250 2,677 3,578 3,837 1,607 3,350 4,854 
 
R-square 0.141 0.136 0.100 0.191 0.257 0.084 0.075 0.077 
                   
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation (8) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. This specification does 
not include HRR fixed effects. Procedure prices are regression-adjusted transaction prices. All regressions include yearly fixed effects. The omitted ownership 
category is private hospitals. 
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Table A11: Estimates of Procedure-Level Regressions (2008 – 2011) including Physician Payments 
                  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 














       
 
Monopoly 0.075 0.107* 0.097*** 0.051** 0.100 0.073* 0.157*** 
  
(0.094) (0.056) (0.036) (0.026) (0.107) (0.039) (0.033) 
 
Duopoly -0.131* -0.079* 0.006 0.01 0.131 0.089** 0.111*** 
  
(0.070) (0.042) (0.033) (0.023) (0.089) (0.041) (0.029) 
 
Triopoly 0.017 -0.010 -0.001 0.001 0.090 0.069 0.093*** 
  
(0.063) (0.051) (0.030) (0.022) (0.057) (0.043) (0.034) 
 
Ln Insurer HHI -0.674 -0.718* -0.463* -0.487* -1.490** -0.518 -0.163 
  
(0.601) (0.411) (0.262) (0.263) (0.665) (0.555) (0.414) 
 
Ln Share HCCI -0.189** -0.130* 0.001 -0.056 -0.115 -0.067 -0.097** 
  
(0.092) (0.066) (0.043) (0.035) (0.090) (0.041) (0.042) 
Hospital Characteristics 
       
 
Ln Technologies -0.001 0.002 0.007* 0.002 0.014* 0.013** 0.008 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
 
Ranked by US News and 
World Reports 
0.017 0.053 0.074*** 0.067*** 0.032 0.074** 0.062* 
 
(0.036) (0.033) (0.025) (0.023) (0.044) (0.035) (0.037) 
 
Ln Number of Beds 0.030 0.012 0.025** 0.030*** 0.088*** -0.011 0.007 
  
(0.029) (0.016) (0.011) (0.008) (0.025) (0.015) (0.012) 
 
Teaching Hospital 0.007 0.0001 0.006 0.008 -0.041 0.023 -0.004 
  
(0.034) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014) (0.031) (0.027) (0.019) 
 
Government Owned -0.168** -0.091 -0.070** -0.082*** -0.162** -0.128*** 0.065 
  
(0.083) (0.058) (0.031) (0.027) (0.067) (0.044) (0.054) 
 
Non-Profit 0.006 0.040 -0.007 0.007 -0.078* -0.094*** 0.055 
  
(0.040) (0.037) (0.017) (0.016) (0.046) (0.025) (0.047) 
County Characteristics 
       
 
Ln Percent Uninsured -0.168* -0.087 -0.159*** -0.056 -0.120 0.026 -0.047 
  
(0.096) (0.112) (0.053) (0.053) (0.107) (0.085) (0.098) 
 
Ln Median Income -0.08 -0.079 -0.171*** 0.005 -0.123 0.108 -0.038 
  
(0.096) (0.118) (0.061) (0.060) (0.132) (0.091) (0.099) 
Other Payers 
       
 
Ln Medicare Base 
Payment Rate 
0.023 -0.025 -0.143** -0.097 -0.147 -0.081 0.034 
 
(0.142) (0.104) (0.072) (0.068) (0.145) (0.103) (0.109) 
 
Ln Share Medicare -0.014 -0.025 -0.057*** -0.044*** -0.001 0.016 -0.001 
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(0.048) (0.023) (0.015) (0.012) (0.046) (0.025) (0.023) 
 
Ln Share Medicaid 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.009 0.046** -0.003 -0.022 
  
(0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.021) (0.019) (0.023) 
         
 
HRR FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 1,250 2,677 3,578 3,837 1,607 3,350 4,854 
 
R-square 0.644 0.544 0.624 0.630 0.604 0.513 0.397 
                 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of equation (8) with standard errors clustered by at the HRR-level in parentheses. Facilities and 




Figure A1: HCCI data Coverage Rates by State 
 
 
Notes: Coverage rates were calculated using 2011 HCCI enrollment data. Statewide insurance coverage totals were 
derived from the American Community Survey for 2011.  
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Lower Limb MRI 
 
Notes: These are scatter plots of hospital list prices for our main procedures (“Chargemaster prices”) and regression-
adjusted transaction prices (“negotiated prices”).  We include providers who deliver ten or more of the specific 
procedure per year. We include prices from 2008 through 2011 that are inflation adjusted into 2011 dollars and 
averaged across the three years. The figures contain the correlation between charges and transaction prices.   
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Figure A3: Map of inpatient spending per beneficiary for Medicare beneficiaries and the 
privately insured 
Panel A: Private Inpatient Spending per Beneficiary, 2011 
  
Panel B: Medicare Inpatient Spending Per Beneficiary, 2011 
 
Notes: Medicare data is drawn from the Dartmouth Atlas (dartmouthatlas.org). Private data is risk-adjusted for age 
and sex using indirect standardization. Spending data does not include prescription drug spending.  
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Notes: This is a scatter plot of HRRs rankings (1-306) on 2011 inpatient spending per Medicare beneficiary and 
spending per privately insured beneficiary. Data on Medicare spending was downloaded from the Dartmouth Atlas 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/. An HRR with a rank of 1 has the lowest spending per beneficiary of all HRRs.  An 
HRR with a rank of 306 has the highest spending per beneficiary of all HRRs.  
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Notes: This is a scatter plot of HRR overall spending per Medicare beneficiary and overall spending per privately 
insured beneficiary. Data on Medicare spending was downloaded from the Dartmouth Atlas 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/. We measure spending in 2011 and spending is measured in dollars. The vertical and 








Notes: This is a scatter plot of HRR inpatient spending per Medicare beneficiary and inpatient spending per 
privately insured beneficiary. Data on Medicare spending was downloaded from the Dartmouth Atlas 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/. We measure spending in 2011 and spending is measured in dollars. The vertical and 


















Notes: These present average hospital regression corrected private-payer prices, averaged from 2008 – 2011 using inflation adjusted 2011 prices. These do not 
include physician fees.  Each column captures a hospital within an HRR.   
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